Lazimnya orang hidup (yang normal) akan selalu berhadapan dengan apa yang dinamakan masalah. Sejak bangun dari tidur sesungguhnya kita sudah berhadapan dengan masalah, baik masalah intern maupun masalah sosial yang melibatkan orang lain atau saling berinteraksi maka masalah yang dihadapi semakin bertambah rumit, kompleks dan memerlukan suatu pemikiran untuk memecahkannya.
Berbagai cara telah dilakukan oleh manusia untuk menyelesaikan masalah yang dihadapi dalam kehidupannya. Dan setiap orang maupun kelompok berusaha dapat memecahkan melalui pola berpikir yang dianggapnya cocok atau sesuai. Kita mestinya berterimakasih kepada-Nya telah dikaruniai akal atau otak agar berfungsi dan dioptimalkan ketika menghadapi masalah yang selalu ada dalam kehidupan ini. Semuanya akan selalu berkembang seirama dengan peradaban serta lingkungan yang banyak mempengaruhinya.
Sejak mengenyam bangku sekolahan sesungguhnya kita telah diajarkan oleh sang guru untuk mengahadapi masalah yang diwujudkan dalam mata pelajaran yaitu bagaimana cara kita membahas suatu masalah guna memperoleh kesimpulan yang dapat diterima kebenarannya. Tentu saja hal ini merupakan bekal yang tinggi nilainya, tak bisa ditebus dengan harta benda apa pun bentuknya. Ditambah lagi dengan bekal pengalaman proses pengembangan diri dalam menuntut ilmu pengetahuan pada level lebih lanjut maka telah menjadikan seseorang semakin dewasa dalam berpikir untuk mengatasi masalah.
Walaupun dalam realitasnya, tidak semua orang yang pernah mengenyam sekolah itu konsisten dengan ilmu pengetahuan yang sudah diperoleh. Bisa dan boleh saja memilih cara atau mungkin langkah yang menurutnya lebih baik sehingga menjadikan pola berpikir untuk memecahkan masalah yang dihadapi semakin bervariasi. Berpikir untuk memecahkan masalah merupakan bagian dari hak otonom setiap manusia sehingga menurutku hal demikian dapat menambah referensi dan keanekaragaman pola berpikir manusia dalam kehidupan di dunia yang fana ini.
Tentu saja semua itu cukup menarik untuk diamati sekalian dicermati sejauhmana seseorang melakukan segala aktivitasnya dalam menyelesaikan atau memecahkan masalah yang dihadapi. Dari beberapa pengalaman selama ini, beberapa pola pikir manusia dapat dirangkum dan masing-masing dapat diketahui seperti di bawah ini:
Pola Pikir Kharismatik
Suatu pola pikir di dalam memecahkan masalah yang dihadapi dengan menggunakan proses penyelesaian masalah didasarkan otoritas atau kewibawaan. Otoritas atau kewibawaan menjadi pokok penentu dalam pengambilan keputusan.
Bagi orang yang memiliki kewibawaan tinggi, misalnya tokoh masyarakat formal atau non-formal (yang disegani) dianggap paling mampu untuk menyelesaikan setiap masalah - sehingga sebagian besar orang akan tunduk pada keputusan yang diambil olehnya. Sering pula beberapa kalangan menyebutnya ini sebagai pola pikir kharismatik, dalam artian bahwa setiap masalah, apalagi masalah rumit dan berkait kebijakan menyangkut kepentingan masyarakat luas - maka apa yang dikatakan tokoh itu dianggapnya yang paling benar.
Pola Pikir Tenasitas
Tenasitas dapat diartikan sebagai kebiasaan. Berpola pikir tenasitas merupakan cara berpikir manusia dalam memecahkan masalah selalu mendasarkan pada kebiasaan-kebiasaan, adat istiadat atau tradisi. Misalnya saja ditemui pada beberapa kalangan jika mendirikan bangunan, jembatan-jembatan dengan menggunakan sesaji, dilengkapi ubo rampe dan sebagainya. Hal ini dilakukan sebagai simbol kebudayaan di lingkungan setempat/terbatas.
Tentu saja pola pikir ini banyak diwarnai oleh kebiasaan-kebiasaan atau kultur yang sangat kuat dan sarat dengan simbol-simbol penuh makna tertentu yang telah dilakukan secara turun temurun. Dengan melakukan kebiasaan ini tentunya banyak makna yang terkandung dan dapat menambah keyakinan sehingga dalam melangsungkan rangkaian aktivitas kehidupan yang penuh dengan masalah - diharapkan dapat berlangsung aman dan lancar.
Pola Pikir Perasaan
Diartikan bahwa manusia didalam memecahkan masalah berdasarkan pada perasaan semata-mata, sehingga cara pengambilan keputusan sangat dipengaruhi oleh subyek pelakunya. Perasaan-perasaan itu selalu muncul pada setiap masalah yang dihadapi. Misalnya, perasaan seseorang dalam proses mengambil keputusan atau menyelesaikan masalah mendominasi dan selalu berperan di dalam perilakunya. Atau dalam kata lain, perasaan di sini banyak turut ambil bagian. Perasaan pada tulisan ini dapat dibagi menjadi dua, yaitu perasaan dalam artian intuisi dan perasaan dalam artian emosi.
Pola pikir berdasarkan intuisi sesungguhnya banyak ditemui. Pola pikir ini tidak bisa buru-buru dikatakan negatif. Namun kalau disebutkan cenderung subyektif dalam proses pengambilan keputusan, jawabnya: mungkin iya. Tingkatan intuisi seseorang tidak selalu sama dalam memecahkan setiap masalah yang dihadapi, berdasarkan kata hati bisa saja diterima kebenarannya, walaupun masih perlu pengujian lebih lanjut. Karenanya keputusan yang diambil biasanya tergantung pada ketajaman intuisi pelakunya.
Pola pikir perasaan dalam artian emosi juga tak kalah pentingnya dicermati. Misalnya, dalam rapat, diskusi (termasuk di ruang publik virtual), seminar, pertemuan antarkelompok, organisasi politik, kampanye-kampanye partai dan sebagainya. Seringkali perasaan (emosi) lebih mengemuka dan bermunculan, biasanya ini terjadi karena “benturan atau persaingan kepentingan” yang tidak sehat, tidak saling toleransi atau tidak menerima pendapat maupun pemikiran orang lain.
Pola Pikir Mencoba-coba
Dimaksudkan sebagai pola pikir manusia ketika menghadapi masalah dengan cara “coba-coba tapi tidak pasti” atau dalam bahasa sono-nya disebut trial and error. Dalam pola pikir ini manusia selalu menyoba-nyoba tanpa adanya kepastian dalam menyelesaikan masalah. Ambil contoh yang paling gampang: Ketika si Badu mengalami kerusakan radio kesayangannya - ia pun tak ambil pusing untuk memeriksa apa penyebab kerusakan radio tersebut. Langsung saja ia memukul-mukul secara pelan (diketuk-ketuk) radionya dengan harapan “berbunyi” kembali. Contoh lain dapat dianalogikan begini: kalau kita melihat burung di dalam sangkar, ketika ia hendak keluar selalu tubruk sana - tubruk sini tak tentu arah di dalam sangkarnya, namun tak juga bisa lepas karena tidak mengetahui cara yang benar untuk membuka pintu sangkarnya.
Ditemui pula pola pikir manusia yang terbiasa “coba-coba tapi tidak ada kepastian” seperti yang telah digambarkan di atas. Alhasil, apa yang dilakukan dalam memecahkan masalah - cenderung berspekulasi (gambling), sering keliru atau pun kalau masalahnya dapat selesai karena faktor kebetulan saja. Blessing in disguise, kira-kiranya begitu.
Pola Pikir Ilmiah
Proses berpikir manusia didasarkan pada cara yang rasional dalam mencari kebenaran atau pemecahan masalah. Penyelesaian masalah bersifat ilmiah. Pada proses berpikir ini biasa dilakukan pengamatan terhadap gejala peristiwa terlebih dahulu. Kemudian dirumuskan masalah yang akan dibahas. Berpikir ilmiah merupakan proses berpikir manusia untuk memperoleh kesimpulan, keputusan, atau kebenaran selalu menggunakan logika dan dilakukan secara sistematis, metodologis, bisa diuji dan dibuktikan kebenarannya oleh orang lain (universal). Sedangkan pelakunya disebut ilmuwan (scientist).
Ilmuwan biasanya bersikap independen, selalu terbuka, demokratis, semua pendapat dihargai. Apabila keputusan atau kesimpulan yang telah dilakukan ternyata salah - maka seorang ilmuwan mengakuinya. Kemudian tertantang untuk mencari cara pemecahan masalah melalui metode yang tepat/sesuai - sehingga diperoleh kesimpulan atau kebenaran (scientific truth). Pada prinsipnya, dalam pola pikir ilmiah dimulai perumusan masalah, pengajuan hipotesis atau asumsi, pengumpulan data, melakukan analisis data, kemudian menarik kesimpulan/konklusi guna mendapatkan kebenaran berupa hasil pemecahan masalah. Perlu ditambahkan bahwa proses berpikir ilmiah membutuhkan waktu relatif lama dan cermat, akan tetapi tingkat kebenarannya dapat dipertanggung jawabkan.
Demikian selintas tulisan mengenali pola pikir manusia dalam memecahkan masalah yang dihadapi. Penulis tak hendak menyebutkan pola pikir mana yang lebih tinggi dalam menilai berbagai pola pikir di atas. Setidaknya, itulah gambaran pola pikir manusia yang dapat dikemukakan. Tidak menutup kemungkinan tulisan ini dapat dikembangkan melalui diskusi lebih lanjut. Semoga dapat menambah pengayaan pengetahuan kita bersama. Salam kompasiana.com
Wednesday, November 23, 2011
Clarification Photo Diode And history
post By Epuel Saepuloh NOV 24 2011
The PIN photodiode was invented by Jun-ichi Nishizawa and his colleagues in 1950.
A RF Microwave PIN diode Attenuator. Picture cou
A RF Microwave PIN diode Attenuator. Picture PIN photodiodes are used in fibre optic network cards and switches. As a photodetector, the PIN diode is reverse biased. Under reverse bias, the diode ordinarily does not conduct (save a small dark current or Is leakage). A photon entering the intrinsic region frees a carrier. The reverse bias field sweeps the carrier out of the region and creates a current. Some detectors can use avalanche multiplication.
The PIN photovoltaic cell works in the same mechanism. In this case, the advantage of using a PIN structure over conventional semiconductor junction is the better long wavelength response of the former. In case of long wavelength irradiation, photons penetrate deep into the cell. But only those electron-hole pairs generated in and near the depletion region contribute to current generation. The depletion region of a PIN structure extends across the intrinsic region, deep into the device. This wider depletion width enables electron-hole pair generation deep within the device. This increases the quantum efficiency of the cell.
Typically, amorphous silicon thin-film cells use PIN structures. On the other hand, CdTe cells use NIP structure, a variation of the PIN structure. In a NIP structure, an intrinsic CdTe layer is sandwiched by n-doped CdS and p-doped ZnTe. The photons are incident on the n-doped layer unlike a PIN diode.
A PIN photodiode can also detect X-ray and gamma ray photons
The PIN photodiode was invented by Jun-ichi Nishizawa and his colleagues in 1950.
A RF Microwave PIN diode Attenuator. Picture cou
A RF Microwave PIN diode Attenuator. Picture PIN photodiodes are used in fibre optic network cards and switches. As a photodetector, the PIN diode is reverse biased. Under reverse bias, the diode ordinarily does not conduct (save a small dark current or Is leakage). A photon entering the intrinsic region frees a carrier. The reverse bias field sweeps the carrier out of the region and creates a current. Some detectors can use avalanche multiplication.
The PIN photovoltaic cell works in the same mechanism. In this case, the advantage of using a PIN structure over conventional semiconductor junction is the better long wavelength response of the former. In case of long wavelength irradiation, photons penetrate deep into the cell. But only those electron-hole pairs generated in and near the depletion region contribute to current generation. The depletion region of a PIN structure extends across the intrinsic region, deep into the device. This wider depletion width enables electron-hole pair generation deep within the device. This increases the quantum efficiency of the cell.
Typically, amorphous silicon thin-film cells use PIN structures. On the other hand, CdTe cells use NIP structure, a variation of the PIN structure. In a NIP structure, an intrinsic CdTe layer is sandwiched by n-doped CdS and p-doped ZnTe. The photons are incident on the n-doped layer unlike a PIN diode.
A PIN photodiode can also detect X-ray and gamma ray photons
KABAR BARU TENTANG JET TEMPUR INDONESIA
Post by: Epuel Paski 23 nov 2011
Membeli jet tempur F16 baru dinilai lebih menguntungkan daripada menerima pesawat hibah dalam kondisi bekas dari Amerika Serikat (AS). Jet tempur baru akan lebih memberikan jaminan keselamatan bagi para prajurit TNI AU.
Demikian pendapat anggota Komisi I DPR dari Fraksi PKS, Al Muzzammil Yusuf, dalam siaran pers yang diterima detikcom.
Al Muzzamil mengatakan, pesawat tempur baru memiliki teknologi dan tingkat keamanan lebih tinggi ketimbang pesawat bekas. Maka, dengan membeli pesawat baru, peluang kecelakaan pesawat TNI AU yang selama ini sering terjadi dapat diminimalisir.
"Dari data yang kami terima sejak tahun 2000-2009, ada sekitar 30 pesawat TNI AU jatuh dan menelan korban jiwa baik dari pihak tentara maupun sipil dalam jumlah besar," terang Al Muzzamil.
Demikian pendapat anggota Komisi I DPR dari Fraksi PKS, Al Muzzammil Yusuf, dalam siaran pers yang diterima detikcom.
Al Muzzamil mengatakan, pesawat tempur baru memiliki teknologi dan tingkat keamanan lebih tinggi ketimbang pesawat bekas. Maka, dengan membeli pesawat baru, peluang kecelakaan pesawat TNI AU yang selama ini sering terjadi dapat diminimalisir.
"Dari data yang kami terima sejak tahun 2000-2009, ada sekitar 30 pesawat TNI AU jatuh dan menelan korban jiwa baik dari pihak tentara maupun sipil dalam jumlah besar," terang Al Muzzamil.
Tuesday, June 28, 2011
MIDRAND
Tue Jun 28, 2011 10:16am By Epuel Paski
MIDRAND (Reuters) - Calls to nationalise South Africa's mines by factions in the ruling ANC are a front to bail out struggling black-owned companies, Communist Party boss Blade Nzimande said on Tuesday.
The radical Youth League of the ruling African National Congress is pushing for mine nationalisation, unnerving investors in the world's No. 1 platinum producer, but President Jacob Zuma's government insists
it is not government policy. "The call for nationalisation by elements within the ANC Youth League, is to save the black economic empowerment elements in crisis, and not to address the interests of the workers and the poor," Nzimande said at a strategy meeting of leaders affiliated to the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU).
"Ten years from now, they will be calling for privatisation, after the state has inherited the debt," he added.
COSATU and the Communist Party were instrumental in Zuma's rise to power but have been largely unimpressed by his indecisiveness and by corruption within his administration.
Political labels have been rendered topsy-turvy by struggles for spoils and power within the ANC. The Communists are opposed to nationalisation, at least publicly, on the grounds it would promote cronyism without tackling poverty. Unions oppose it as they see it threatening investment and jobs. The Youth League's drive for nationalisation is seen steered in part by stealth-capitalists who could benefit from it.
The ANC elects a new leader next year and Zuma's only chances of retaining the top post rests with the renewed support from his communist and union allies.
Zuma has alienated popular ANC Youth League leader Julius Malema and the millions of poor and disenchanted youngsters he represents by dismissing their drive to get nationalisation accepted as government policy.
Sources in the ANC have said that Malema and the pro-business faction he represents, some who will benefit from nationalisation, want Zuma replaced by a leader who will be more sympathetic to their demands which include seizing white-owned farms without compensation.
On Monday Zuma opened the four-day conference warning union leaders not to overstate their role and make undue demands. COSATU said that Zuma cannot take its support for granted and is likely to wring policy concessions in return for support.
MIDRAND (Reuters) - Calls to nationalise South Africa's mines by factions in the ruling ANC are a front to bail out struggling black-owned companies, Communist Party boss Blade Nzimande said on Tuesday.
The radical Youth League of the ruling African National Congress is pushing for mine nationalisation, unnerving investors in the world's No. 1 platinum producer, but President Jacob Zuma's government insists
it is not government policy. "The call for nationalisation by elements within the ANC Youth League, is to save the black economic empowerment elements in crisis, and not to address the interests of the workers and the poor," Nzimande said at a strategy meeting of leaders affiliated to the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU).
"Ten years from now, they will be calling for privatisation, after the state has inherited the debt," he added.
COSATU and the Communist Party were instrumental in Zuma's rise to power but have been largely unimpressed by his indecisiveness and by corruption within his administration.
Political labels have been rendered topsy-turvy by struggles for spoils and power within the ANC. The Communists are opposed to nationalisation, at least publicly, on the grounds it would promote cronyism without tackling poverty. Unions oppose it as they see it threatening investment and jobs. The Youth League's drive for nationalisation is seen steered in part by stealth-capitalists who could benefit from it.
The ANC elects a new leader next year and Zuma's only chances of retaining the top post rests with the renewed support from his communist and union allies.
Zuma has alienated popular ANC Youth League leader Julius Malema and the millions of poor and disenchanted youngsters he represents by dismissing their drive to get nationalisation accepted as government policy.
Sources in the ANC have said that Malema and the pro-business faction he represents, some who will benefit from nationalisation, want Zuma replaced by a leader who will be more sympathetic to their demands which include seizing white-owned farms without compensation.
On Monday Zuma opened the four-day conference warning union leaders not to overstate their role and make undue demands. COSATU said that Zuma cannot take its support for granted and is likely to wring policy concessions in return for support.
Analysis - Foreign worker exodus to spark Malaysian labour crunch
Wed Jun 22, 2011 8:48am
By Epuel Paski
KUALA LUMPUR (Reuters) - Indonesian plumber Yadi has been plying his trade in Malaysia since 2003, part of a two million-strong migrant labour force that forms the backbone of Kuala Lumpur's plantations and construction industries.
But now, the 30-year old wants to go home as wages rise and job opportunities open up in Jakarta, a growing trend among Indonesian workers that analysts say could produce a labour crunch and slower economic growth for Malaysia.
"I have heard a lot from friends and relatives about jobs opening up in my home country, and if I can as easily earn just slightly less in a city like Jakarta compared to what I make now, I will go back," said Yadi, who earns 90 ringgit (18 pounds) a day as a plumber's assistant.
From minding babies to erecting skyscrapers, Malaysia's economy has been supported over the last three decades by a foreign workforce drawn mainly from Indonesia, the Philippines, Bangladesh and Nepal as an industrialisation drive created a wealth of low-paying jobs shunned by locals.
But as more employment opportunities open up in other Asian economies, Malaysia's appeal as a destination for manual jobs is waning.
This, combined with a six-month government programme beginning in July to send home illegal workers, could result in an acute labour shortage.
Under the plan announced on Wednesday, the government will ship home some foreign workers to reduce the number of illegals, although it has yet to determine the number.
"If the government gets it wrong on the labour policy, Malaysia will lose competitiveness in these economic sectors," said Credit Suisse economist Kun Lung Wu.
If you don't get domestic workers to move into these jobs and create higher value, you lose out on the lower cost production segment. Investors won't want come to Malaysia and the pace of economic growth will become slower."
Boosting competitiveness and transforming Malaysia's economy into a high-end manufacturing and services hub is a key plank of Prime Minister Najib Razak's reform agenda.
Najib, who took office two years ago, is betting on a series of structural economic reforms to help Malaysia secure a new niche that can woo back foreign investments which have left for other Asian countries.
SHORTAGES IN PALM OIL SECTOR
Migrant workers, up to two million strong, account for 21 percent of Malaysia's workforce. In particular, the palm oil sector, second only to neighbouring Indonesia in terms of production, relies heavily on foreign labourers.
Eight out of every 10 workers in the plantations sector is a non-Malaysian, according to the Malaysian Employers' Federation and a drop in foreign worker arrivals could further worsen a labour shortage and lower output growth.
As more Malaysian palm oil firms expand in Indonesia to overcome a shortage of land, Indonesians have fewer reasons to seek employment outside their home country.
"Malaysia will soon begin to lose foreign workers from Indonesia as the pace of economic growth in Indonesia will allow an increasing number of Indonesians to find jobs in their own country," said Indonesian embassy spokesman Suryana Satradireja.
Indonesia's economy is forecast by the government and analysts to expand 6.4 percent in 2011, the third-highest in Asia after China and India.
In the construction sector, where two-thirds of the workforce is foreign, a labour crunch could disrupt large government infrastructure projects with a significant multiplier effect, such as a $11.5 billion (7.12 billion pound) rail line.
Many Indonesians also work as domestic helpers. One in every 16 residents in the capital Kuala Lumpur hires an Indonesian helper, according to data from the Indonesian embassy.
Jakarta banned its citizens from working as maids in Malaysia in 2009 following allegations of abuse, but a deal reached in April will pave the way for hiring to begin again.
An Indonesian working as a housemaid in cities like Jakarta can now earn up to 1,000,000 rupiah, equivalent to about $116. That is only slightly less than the salary in Malaysia, without considering other expenses incurred by foreigners, Suryana said.
Analysts say Malaysia can plug any gap in labour needs by sourcing from other countries.
But such a solution would only be temporary and efforts must be directed at avoiding the "middle income trap" -- under which Malaysia finds itself unable to move beyond its low-end manufacturing niche to become a developed economy.
"It is vital that Malaysia overcome its reliance on cheap foreign workers so as to avoid the middle income trap," said Manu Bhaskaran, chief executive of Centennial Asia Advisors in Singapore, which advises on economics and policy.
(Additional reporting by Niluksi Koswanage; editing by Liau Y-Sing and Ron Popeski)
By Epuel Paski
KUALA LUMPUR (Reuters) - Indonesian plumber Yadi has been plying his trade in Malaysia since 2003, part of a two million-strong migrant labour force that forms the backbone of Kuala Lumpur's plantations and construction industries.
But now, the 30-year old wants to go home as wages rise and job opportunities open up in Jakarta, a growing trend among Indonesian workers that analysts say could produce a labour crunch and slower economic growth for Malaysia.
"I have heard a lot from friends and relatives about jobs opening up in my home country, and if I can as easily earn just slightly less in a city like Jakarta compared to what I make now, I will go back," said Yadi, who earns 90 ringgit (18 pounds) a day as a plumber's assistant.
From minding babies to erecting skyscrapers, Malaysia's economy has been supported over the last three decades by a foreign workforce drawn mainly from Indonesia, the Philippines, Bangladesh and Nepal as an industrialisation drive created a wealth of low-paying jobs shunned by locals.
But as more employment opportunities open up in other Asian economies, Malaysia's appeal as a destination for manual jobs is waning.
This, combined with a six-month government programme beginning in July to send home illegal workers, could result in an acute labour shortage.
Under the plan announced on Wednesday, the government will ship home some foreign workers to reduce the number of illegals, although it has yet to determine the number.
"If the government gets it wrong on the labour policy, Malaysia will lose competitiveness in these economic sectors," said Credit Suisse economist Kun Lung Wu.
If you don't get domestic workers to move into these jobs and create higher value, you lose out on the lower cost production segment. Investors won't want come to Malaysia and the pace of economic growth will become slower."
Boosting competitiveness and transforming Malaysia's economy into a high-end manufacturing and services hub is a key plank of Prime Minister Najib Razak's reform agenda.
Najib, who took office two years ago, is betting on a series of structural economic reforms to help Malaysia secure a new niche that can woo back foreign investments which have left for other Asian countries.
SHORTAGES IN PALM OIL SECTOR
Migrant workers, up to two million strong, account for 21 percent of Malaysia's workforce. In particular, the palm oil sector, second only to neighbouring Indonesia in terms of production, relies heavily on foreign labourers.
Eight out of every 10 workers in the plantations sector is a non-Malaysian, according to the Malaysian Employers' Federation and a drop in foreign worker arrivals could further worsen a labour shortage and lower output growth.
As more Malaysian palm oil firms expand in Indonesia to overcome a shortage of land, Indonesians have fewer reasons to seek employment outside their home country.
"Malaysia will soon begin to lose foreign workers from Indonesia as the pace of economic growth in Indonesia will allow an increasing number of Indonesians to find jobs in their own country," said Indonesian embassy spokesman Suryana Satradireja.
Indonesia's economy is forecast by the government and analysts to expand 6.4 percent in 2011, the third-highest in Asia after China and India.
In the construction sector, where two-thirds of the workforce is foreign, a labour crunch could disrupt large government infrastructure projects with a significant multiplier effect, such as a $11.5 billion (7.12 billion pound) rail line.
Many Indonesians also work as domestic helpers. One in every 16 residents in the capital Kuala Lumpur hires an Indonesian helper, according to data from the Indonesian embassy.
Jakarta banned its citizens from working as maids in Malaysia in 2009 following allegations of abuse, but a deal reached in April will pave the way for hiring to begin again.
An Indonesian working as a housemaid in cities like Jakarta can now earn up to 1,000,000 rupiah, equivalent to about $116. That is only slightly less than the salary in Malaysia, without considering other expenses incurred by foreigners, Suryana said.
Analysts say Malaysia can plug any gap in labour needs by sourcing from other countries.
But such a solution would only be temporary and efforts must be directed at avoiding the "middle income trap" -- under which Malaysia finds itself unable to move beyond its low-end manufacturing niche to become a developed economy.
"It is vital that Malaysia overcome its reliance on cheap foreign workers so as to avoid the middle income trap," said Manu Bhaskaran, chief executive of Centennial Asia Advisors in Singapore, which advises on economics and policy.
(Additional reporting by Niluksi Koswanage; editing by Liau Y-Sing and Ron Popeski)
DEMOCRATIC DECENTRALIZATION
Abstract
In one study, James Manor (1999, 101-102) stressed that democratic decentralization is always attended
by an increase in the number of persons who are involved in corrupt acts. This situation according to
Manor can be prevented if strong, democratic, decentralized institutions are allowed to function for
extended periods through a combination of processes: with democratic institutions stimulating (as they
do) the development of civil society; while organized interests, the press, and others acquire skills and
the inclination to make the system work well. In the context of Indonesia, the latest developments
indicates as revealed by the Minister of Home Affairs in a working meeting with the Regional
Representatives Council on January 17, 2011 that so far there are 17 governors (of 33) and 138
regents/mayor (of 497) who became a suspect in criminal cases, especially in corruption case. There are
at least three main causes why those Head of Regions entry into the trap of corruption, namely: due
process of procurement of goods and services through a kickback, mark up, bribery and embezzlement;
due to abuse of social assistance funds through a fictitious proposal, embezzlement and enrich others
parties as well as due to the process of granting certain permissions. Contextually, this situation
occurred due to a very large discretion of the Head of Regions in the management of Local Budgets that
ranging from the budgeting process, utilization and accountability that are laden with his or her political
interests. Corruption occurs commonly associated with leakage in the use of the budget, particularly
from the revenue and spending. This paper tries to discuss, analyze and give an answer why it has
happened and the various efforts that can be done to fix it. Through the literature study, this paper will
attempt to describe the current condition of a number of corruption cases that involving the Head of
Regions in Indonesia.
Keywords: Democratic Decentralization; Corruption; Indonesia; Head of Regions
1. Introduction
In the context of governance, a regional government is considered to assist in the creation of
governance. This can be seen from many expert opinions as quoted by Campos and Hellman (2005 in
World Bank, 2005, 237) that decentralization will make local officials more accountable to constituents
for their performance. However, these conditions cannot simply be achieved. There are a number of
conditions that must be met in order to realize governance in the regional administration, including
establishing mechanisms to promote broad civic participation and more responsive and accountable
local governments (Wong and Guggenheim, 2005 in World Bank, 2005, 253). In addition, according to
Azfar et al (1999, 1) devolution should increase the accountability of government officials and
discourage most forms of corruption where government actions are transparent and civil society is
permitted to operate freely.
* Paper presented at the 2011 Conference on Decentralization and Democratization in Southeast Asia, held by the
Freiburg Southeast Asia Study Group, University of Freiburg, Freiburg, Germany, June 15-17, 2011.
The importance of the mechanism as disclosed by experts above cannot be separated from the fact that
the decentralization also provides greater opportunities for corruption. This is as presented by Monte
and Papagni (2007, 381) by citing opinion from Prud’home (1995) and Tanzi (1995) that corruption may
be greater at the local level because of the greater intimacy and frequency of interaction between
private individuals and officials at more decentralized levels.
Associated with this condition, in one study, James Manor (1999, 101-102) stressed that democratic
decentralization is always attended by an increase in the number of persons who are involved in corrupt
acts. This situation according to Manor can be prevented if strong, democratic, decentralized institutions
are allowed to function for extended periods through a combination of processes: with democratic
institutions stimulating (as they do) the development of civil society; while organized interests, the
press, and others acquire skills and the inclination to make the system work well.
In the context of Indonesia, the latest developments indicates as revealed by the Minister of Home
Affairs in a working meeting with the Regional Representatives Council on January 17, 2011 that so far
there are 17 governors (of 33) and 138 regents/mayor (of 497) who became a suspect in criminal cases,
especially in corruption case. These facts emphasize the condition as expressed by various experts that
the implementation of decentralization in Indonesia was marked by the increasing corruption in
Regional Government. Rinaldi, Purnomo, and Damayanti (2007) for example, revealed that even since
the enactment of Regional Autonomy under the Law No. 22 year 1999 on Regional Government in the
year 2001 there have been trends of corruption in Regional Government which has increased sharply.
This condition occurs according to Chaniago (2004 as quoted in Koran Tempo) as a result of increased
legislative and executive powers in the regions that are not accompanied by a transparent accountability
mechanism to the public.
In connection with a corruption case that involving a number of Head of Regions as disclosed above,
based on data from a number of corruption cases related to Head of Regions that handled by Komisi
Pemberantasan Korupsi (KPK/Corruption Eradication Commission) for example (see Table 2), there are
at least three main causes why those Head of Regions entry into the trap of corruption, namely: due
process of procurement of goods and services through a kickback, mark up, bribery and embezzlement;
due to abuse of social assistance funds through a fictitious proposal, embezzlement and enrich others
parties as well as due to the process of granting certain permissions. Contextually, this situation
occurred due to a very large discretion of the Head of Regions in the management of Local Budgets that
ranging from the budgeting process, utilization and accountability that are laden with his or her political
interests. Corruption occurs commonly associated with leakage in the use of the budget, particularly
from the revenue and spending.
Departing from diverse backgrounds above, this paper tries to discuss, analyze and give an answer why
the situation has happened and the various efforts that can be done to fix it. Through the literature
study, this paper will attempt to describe the current condition of a number of corruption cases that
involving the Head of Regions in Indonesia, especially from the cases that handled by the KPK. In order
to achieve its goal, this paper consists of several parts. The first section will describe the background of
why this theme was raised. The second part will discuss the conceptual study of decentralization and its
relation to corruption. The third section will discuss about some of corruption cases that involving heads
of regions after the big bang decentralization in Indonesia that handheld by the KPK. The fourth section
will analyze the cases and efforts in the future that can be done to prevent it. And the last or fifth part
will contain the conclusions and recommendations related to policies that must be taken to reduce the
occurrence of similar cases.
2. Conceptualization of decentralization and its link with corruption
According to Bjedov, Madies and Schnyder (2010, 13), the study of the link between decentralization
and corruption is the object of a relatively recent and expanding literature even though we can already
find tracks of this debate in the work of authors such as Brennan and Buchanan (1977; 1980). Related to
this, in the end there are two different views about the linkages between decentralization and
corruption. First view assumes that decentralization can impact positively on the corruption, while
others view consider that decentralization would give a negative impact on corruption. The second view
in my opinion is more due to the non-fulfillment of a number of requirements that should exist in the
implementation of a decentralized policy so that decentralization is actually expected to support the
creation of good governance but in the end it turned out creates conditions for bad governance, which
marked one of them with increasing corruption.
Related to this, the successful implementation of decentralization according to Rondinelli, Nellis and
Cheema (1983, 34-35) will be determined by at least 6 (six) factors, namely: (1) the degree to which
decentralization contributes to achieving broad political objectives, such as promoting political stability;
mobilizing support and cooperation for national development policies; and providing heterogeneous
regions, interests, and communities with a stake in the survival of the political system; (2) the degree to
which decentralization increases administrative effectiveness, by promoting greater coordination among
units of the national government and between them and sub-national administrative units, local
governments, and nongovernmental organizations, or by encouraging closer cooperation among
organizations to attain mutually acceptable development goals; (3) the degree to which decentralization
contributes to promoting economic and managerial efficiency, by allowing government at both the
central and local levels to achieve development goals in a more cost-effective manner; (4) the degree to
which decentralization increases government responsiveness to the needs and demands of various
interest groups within society; (5) the degree to which decentralization contributes to greater selfdetermination
and self-reliance among subordinate units of administration or nongovernment
organizations in promoting development or meeting highly valued needs within society; and (6) The
appropriateness of the means by which policies and programs are designed and carried out to achieve
the goals of decentralization, however they are defined.
In line with the views from Rondinelli, Nellis and Cheema, Kauzya (2005, 9-10) offers 5 (five)
characteristics that should be considered in designing democratic decentralization policy which are: (1)
legal framework: instituting constitutional and legal reforms to devolve power to local structures; (2)
local governance capacity: increasing local governance actors’ ability to act (financial and human
resources, organization, authority); (3) increasing local government accountability; (4) role of civil
society (practice of horizontal decentralization /community empowerment); and (5) socio-economic well
being: (improving quality of life).
To be able to make decentralization can support the creation of good governance particularly in
improving the effectiveness and accountability, then according to Manor (1999) as cited by Johnson
(2001, 527) elected bodies at local levels have adequate funds; they enjoy substantive autonomy; and
lines of accountability exist between elected representatives and citizens, and between non-elected
bureaucrats and elected representatives. In line with Manor opinion, according to the World Bank
Institute (2001, 8) to improve governance and fighting corruption in local governments can be done
through local government reforms that related to simplified administrative procedures; increased citizen
participation in government; and monitoring and evaluation systems. This reform in local government is
part of the reforms implemented nationally.
In terms of accountability, according to Shah (1998, 15) is the key to the success of decentralized
decision making. However it entails institutions and mechanisms for citizen’s voice and exit, norms and
networks of civic engagement; social consensus; preservation instinct of a "stationary bandit" who
monopolizes and rationalizes theft in the form of taxes; judicial accountability; vertical and horizontal
accountability. Meanwhile, regarding public participation according to Shah (1998, 21) is an instrument
that can ensures that public goods are consistent with voter preferences and public sector
accountability. Such participation is possible only if political freedom (voice and exit) is permitted and
political stability prevails. Decentralization strengthens citizen participation by bringing governments
closer to the people they are intended to serve.
In the context of decentralization in Indonesia since the Law No. 22 year 1999 to Law No. 32 year 2004 is
turned out not to produce maximum results, otherwise even the majority showed an indication of
failure (Prasojo, 2009, 121). The failure of this regional autonomy according to Prasojo (2009, 122) is
reflected in an absence of the dimensions of political of equality, local responsiveness and local
accountability in government efficiency, public service, financial management, management of natural
resources, and direct election of head of regions. Further according to Prasojo (2011), in addition to
producing head of regions that innovative and pro- local progress, regional autonomy has also created
some head of regions that are genetically potential to become corrupt. These head of regions is usually
very happy with his or her power and tend to abuse his or her power and authority or may also act
arbitrarily. Not only was not innovative, these power-hungry head of regions is indeed not have a
commitment for progress of his or her regions.
There are at least five causes why so many head of regions become suspects in corruption cases in
addition to the high cost of local elections according to Prasojo (2011): (1) the use of discretion by the
head of regions that is not controlled; (2) the oligarchy and dynasty rule; (3) the incompatibility system;
(4) the lack of central government oversight; and (5) the weakness of civil society oversight. What was
mention by Prasojo about the cause of corruption by head of regions in Indonesia is very consistent with
the opinion in most of the literatures on common causes of corruption. From the literatures it is known
that corruption is caused by a number of factors which have contributed either directly or indirectly. In
addition, the factors causing corruption also can be distinguished among the factors associated with
individual characteristics and structural influences.
Opinions about the causes of corruption by direct and indirect factors can be found in the writings of
Tanzi (1998, 565-576). According to Tanzi, there are at least 6 (six) factors as the direct causes of
corruption, namely: (1) regulations and authorizations; (2) taxation; (3) spending decisions; (4)
provisions for goods and services at below-market prices; (5) other discretionary decisions; and (6)
financing of parties. Meanwhile, the indirect cause of corruption consists of at least 6 (six) factors,
namely: (1) quality of the bureaucracy; (2) level of public sector wages; (3) penalty systems; (4)
institutional controls; (5) transparency of rules, laws and processes; and (6) examples by the leadership.
The explanation of the causes of corruption that associated with the characteristics of individual and
structural influences can be seen in the writings of Nas, Price and Weber (1986, 109). According to them,
the individual-level explanation tends to view the corrupt act as the result of greed or the inability to
withstand temptations on the part of weak or insufficiently ethical officials. Greed, or desire for gain, is
indeed a strong motivator of human behavior, as the literature suggest. While the causes of corruption
from the structural side are caused by 3 (three) things: (1) bureaucratic or organizational; (2) quality of
citizen involvement; and (3) congruence of the legal system to social demands.
Meanwhile, in the view of Shah (2007, 236), the occurrence of corruption in the public sector will be
highly dependent on a multitude of factors, namely: (1) the quality of public sector management; (2) the
nature of accountability relations between the government and citizens; (3) the legal framework; and (4)
the degree to which public sector processes are accompanied by transparency and dissemination of
information. Efforts to address corruption that fail to adequately account for these underlying drivers
are unlikely to generate profound and sustainable results.
3. Review on some of corruption cases that involving head of regions after the big bang
decentralization in Indonesia that handled by KPK
In order to achieve the expected goal, I try to describe a number of corruption cases from the Head of
Regions that handled by KPK since 2004-2010. The cases that presented here are cases that has had
permanent legal force and executed. The reason for the selection of the cases that handled by KPK is
based on the availability of information that can be accessed. As known, KPK every year since 2004,
always publish an annual report that it also contains statistical data, description and status of various
cases of corruption that they are handled, including the cases of corruption that involving the Head of
Regions. However, given the fact that KPK is a new institution that just established in December 2003,
the cases handled by them are cases that started from 2004 while the big bang decentralization in
Indonesia has been conducted since January 2001. Therefore, the cases presented here cannot describe
the progress of cases from before 2001 and in the period 2001-2003. From the various cases, then will
be selected 4 cases to be further described. The selection of cases is based on the availability of
information as well as the different types of case.
By referring to the KPK annual reports during 2004-2010, we could obtained information on various
corruption cases that handled by the KPK, as can be seen in table 1. Based on data in table 1, it can be
seen that from 245 corruption cases handled by the KPK since 2004 to 2010, about 30 cases (12.24%)
are the cases that involving the Head of Regions, of which 8 cases involving the Governor and remain 22
cases involving the Regent/Mayor. Where are averaged, each year there are at least 4 cases of
corruption that involving the Head of Regions. This condition is of course very disturbing for us. It is by
remembering that the cases are only the cases that handled by the KPK. There are still some other cases
of corruption by the Head of Regions that handled by the Attorney General Office that its number is
likely far more than the cases that handled by the KPK. This is related to the size of the KPK compared to
the organization of the Attorney General Office. These conditions also troubling because it is also related
to the important role and large function of a Head of Region in the era of regional autonomy. The
involvement of so many Head of Regions in various corruption cases could indicate that they are still
some problematic in the implementation of decentralization in Indonesia. The practice of
decentralization in Indonesia has not been able to support the implementation of good governance. The
successful implementation of decentralization in support of good governance would be marked by small
number of corruption cases that plagued the regional governments, especially that done and involving a
Head of Region. The large number of corruption cases that involving Head of Region have indicated the
persistence of problems that must be corrected in the implementation of decentralization in Indonesia.
As closing remarks, it can be concluded that the implementation of decentralization in Indonesia in
practice has led to many cases of corruption by head of regions. This occurs as a result of the weakness
or absence of legal framework; mechanisms of accountability and transparency in regional government,
role and participation of the community; and monitoring and evaluation system by the central
government. Mechanisms of accountability and transparency as well as the role and participation of the
community are an issue that is relatively less attention so far from government.
In order to reduce the occurrence of corruption committed by head of regions, various improvement
and reinforcement of the weaknesses had to be done. Strengthening mechanisms of accountability,
transparency and public participation should be the main agenda that must be done by governments
and other stakeholders. In addition, improvements to the legal framework and system of monitoring
and evaluation by the central government to regional governments should still be done.
References
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Economists Have to Say about It”, Urban Public Economics Review, No. 3, pp. 12-33
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Participation, Florida: CRC Taylor & Francis Group
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DPADM Discussion paper, DPADM, DESA, UN, pp. 1-18
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Pengelolaan Belanja Bantuan Sosial di Pemerintahan Daerah”, Bahan Paparan, Jakarta, 5 April
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prone)
Kompas, 26 Maret 2011, “Kasus Korupsi Kehutanan: Bupati Siak Arwin AS ditahan KPK” (Corruption case
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http://www.tempo.co.id/hg/narasi/2004/11/04/nrs,20041104-01,id.html (Desentralisasi Korupsi
Melalui Otonomi Daerah/Decentralization Corruption through Regional Autonomy)
http://acch.kpk.go.id/web/guest/samsuri-aspar
http://acch.kpk.go.id/web/guest/abdillah
http://acch.kpk.go.id/web/guest/jimmy-rimba-rogi
In one study, James Manor (1999, 101-102) stressed that democratic decentralization is always attended
by an increase in the number of persons who are involved in corrupt acts. This situation according to
Manor can be prevented if strong, democratic, decentralized institutions are allowed to function for
extended periods through a combination of processes: with democratic institutions stimulating (as they
do) the development of civil society; while organized interests, the press, and others acquire skills and
the inclination to make the system work well. In the context of Indonesia, the latest developments
indicates as revealed by the Minister of Home Affairs in a working meeting with the Regional
Representatives Council on January 17, 2011 that so far there are 17 governors (of 33) and 138
regents/mayor (of 497) who became a suspect in criminal cases, especially in corruption case. There are
at least three main causes why those Head of Regions entry into the trap of corruption, namely: due
process of procurement of goods and services through a kickback, mark up, bribery and embezzlement;
due to abuse of social assistance funds through a fictitious proposal, embezzlement and enrich others
parties as well as due to the process of granting certain permissions. Contextually, this situation
occurred due to a very large discretion of the Head of Regions in the management of Local Budgets that
ranging from the budgeting process, utilization and accountability that are laden with his or her political
interests. Corruption occurs commonly associated with leakage in the use of the budget, particularly
from the revenue and spending. This paper tries to discuss, analyze and give an answer why it has
happened and the various efforts that can be done to fix it. Through the literature study, this paper will
attempt to describe the current condition of a number of corruption cases that involving the Head of
Regions in Indonesia.
Keywords: Democratic Decentralization; Corruption; Indonesia; Head of Regions
1. Introduction
In the context of governance, a regional government is considered to assist in the creation of
governance. This can be seen from many expert opinions as quoted by Campos and Hellman (2005 in
World Bank, 2005, 237) that decentralization will make local officials more accountable to constituents
for their performance. However, these conditions cannot simply be achieved. There are a number of
conditions that must be met in order to realize governance in the regional administration, including
establishing mechanisms to promote broad civic participation and more responsive and accountable
local governments (Wong and Guggenheim, 2005 in World Bank, 2005, 253). In addition, according to
Azfar et al (1999, 1) devolution should increase the accountability of government officials and
discourage most forms of corruption where government actions are transparent and civil society is
permitted to operate freely.
* Paper presented at the 2011 Conference on Decentralization and Democratization in Southeast Asia, held by the
Freiburg Southeast Asia Study Group, University of Freiburg, Freiburg, Germany, June 15-17, 2011.
The importance of the mechanism as disclosed by experts above cannot be separated from the fact that
the decentralization also provides greater opportunities for corruption. This is as presented by Monte
and Papagni (2007, 381) by citing opinion from Prud’home (1995) and Tanzi (1995) that corruption may
be greater at the local level because of the greater intimacy and frequency of interaction between
private individuals and officials at more decentralized levels.
Associated with this condition, in one study, James Manor (1999, 101-102) stressed that democratic
decentralization is always attended by an increase in the number of persons who are involved in corrupt
acts. This situation according to Manor can be prevented if strong, democratic, decentralized institutions
are allowed to function for extended periods through a combination of processes: with democratic
institutions stimulating (as they do) the development of civil society; while organized interests, the
press, and others acquire skills and the inclination to make the system work well.
In the context of Indonesia, the latest developments indicates as revealed by the Minister of Home
Affairs in a working meeting with the Regional Representatives Council on January 17, 2011 that so far
there are 17 governors (of 33) and 138 regents/mayor (of 497) who became a suspect in criminal cases,
especially in corruption case. These facts emphasize the condition as expressed by various experts that
the implementation of decentralization in Indonesia was marked by the increasing corruption in
Regional Government. Rinaldi, Purnomo, and Damayanti (2007) for example, revealed that even since
the enactment of Regional Autonomy under the Law No. 22 year 1999 on Regional Government in the
year 2001 there have been trends of corruption in Regional Government which has increased sharply.
This condition occurs according to Chaniago (2004 as quoted in Koran Tempo) as a result of increased
legislative and executive powers in the regions that are not accompanied by a transparent accountability
mechanism to the public.
In connection with a corruption case that involving a number of Head of Regions as disclosed above,
based on data from a number of corruption cases related to Head of Regions that handled by Komisi
Pemberantasan Korupsi (KPK/Corruption Eradication Commission) for example (see Table 2), there are
at least three main causes why those Head of Regions entry into the trap of corruption, namely: due
process of procurement of goods and services through a kickback, mark up, bribery and embezzlement;
due to abuse of social assistance funds through a fictitious proposal, embezzlement and enrich others
parties as well as due to the process of granting certain permissions. Contextually, this situation
occurred due to a very large discretion of the Head of Regions in the management of Local Budgets that
ranging from the budgeting process, utilization and accountability that are laden with his or her political
interests. Corruption occurs commonly associated with leakage in the use of the budget, particularly
from the revenue and spending.
Departing from diverse backgrounds above, this paper tries to discuss, analyze and give an answer why
the situation has happened and the various efforts that can be done to fix it. Through the literature
study, this paper will attempt to describe the current condition of a number of corruption cases that
involving the Head of Regions in Indonesia, especially from the cases that handled by the KPK. In order
to achieve its goal, this paper consists of several parts. The first section will describe the background of
why this theme was raised. The second part will discuss the conceptual study of decentralization and its
relation to corruption. The third section will discuss about some of corruption cases that involving heads
of regions after the big bang decentralization in Indonesia that handheld by the KPK. The fourth section
will analyze the cases and efforts in the future that can be done to prevent it. And the last or fifth part
will contain the conclusions and recommendations related to policies that must be taken to reduce the
occurrence of similar cases.
2. Conceptualization of decentralization and its link with corruption
According to Bjedov, Madies and Schnyder (2010, 13), the study of the link between decentralization
and corruption is the object of a relatively recent and expanding literature even though we can already
find tracks of this debate in the work of authors such as Brennan and Buchanan (1977; 1980). Related to
this, in the end there are two different views about the linkages between decentralization and
corruption. First view assumes that decentralization can impact positively on the corruption, while
others view consider that decentralization would give a negative impact on corruption. The second view
in my opinion is more due to the non-fulfillment of a number of requirements that should exist in the
implementation of a decentralized policy so that decentralization is actually expected to support the
creation of good governance but in the end it turned out creates conditions for bad governance, which
marked one of them with increasing corruption.
Related to this, the successful implementation of decentralization according to Rondinelli, Nellis and
Cheema (1983, 34-35) will be determined by at least 6 (six) factors, namely: (1) the degree to which
decentralization contributes to achieving broad political objectives, such as promoting political stability;
mobilizing support and cooperation for national development policies; and providing heterogeneous
regions, interests, and communities with a stake in the survival of the political system; (2) the degree to
which decentralization increases administrative effectiveness, by promoting greater coordination among
units of the national government and between them and sub-national administrative units, local
governments, and nongovernmental organizations, or by encouraging closer cooperation among
organizations to attain mutually acceptable development goals; (3) the degree to which decentralization
contributes to promoting economic and managerial efficiency, by allowing government at both the
central and local levels to achieve development goals in a more cost-effective manner; (4) the degree to
which decentralization increases government responsiveness to the needs and demands of various
interest groups within society; (5) the degree to which decentralization contributes to greater selfdetermination
and self-reliance among subordinate units of administration or nongovernment
organizations in promoting development or meeting highly valued needs within society; and (6) The
appropriateness of the means by which policies and programs are designed and carried out to achieve
the goals of decentralization, however they are defined.
In line with the views from Rondinelli, Nellis and Cheema, Kauzya (2005, 9-10) offers 5 (five)
characteristics that should be considered in designing democratic decentralization policy which are: (1)
legal framework: instituting constitutional and legal reforms to devolve power to local structures; (2)
local governance capacity: increasing local governance actors’ ability to act (financial and human
resources, organization, authority); (3) increasing local government accountability; (4) role of civil
society (practice of horizontal decentralization /community empowerment); and (5) socio-economic well
being: (improving quality of life).
To be able to make decentralization can support the creation of good governance particularly in
improving the effectiveness and accountability, then according to Manor (1999) as cited by Johnson
(2001, 527) elected bodies at local levels have adequate funds; they enjoy substantive autonomy; and
lines of accountability exist between elected representatives and citizens, and between non-elected
bureaucrats and elected representatives. In line with Manor opinion, according to the World Bank
Institute (2001, 8) to improve governance and fighting corruption in local governments can be done
through local government reforms that related to simplified administrative procedures; increased citizen
participation in government; and monitoring and evaluation systems. This reform in local government is
part of the reforms implemented nationally.
In terms of accountability, according to Shah (1998, 15) is the key to the success of decentralized
decision making. However it entails institutions and mechanisms for citizen’s voice and exit, norms and
networks of civic engagement; social consensus; preservation instinct of a "stationary bandit" who
monopolizes and rationalizes theft in the form of taxes; judicial accountability; vertical and horizontal
accountability. Meanwhile, regarding public participation according to Shah (1998, 21) is an instrument
that can ensures that public goods are consistent with voter preferences and public sector
accountability. Such participation is possible only if political freedom (voice and exit) is permitted and
political stability prevails. Decentralization strengthens citizen participation by bringing governments
closer to the people they are intended to serve.
In the context of decentralization in Indonesia since the Law No. 22 year 1999 to Law No. 32 year 2004 is
turned out not to produce maximum results, otherwise even the majority showed an indication of
failure (Prasojo, 2009, 121). The failure of this regional autonomy according to Prasojo (2009, 122) is
reflected in an absence of the dimensions of political of equality, local responsiveness and local
accountability in government efficiency, public service, financial management, management of natural
resources, and direct election of head of regions. Further according to Prasojo (2011), in addition to
producing head of regions that innovative and pro- local progress, regional autonomy has also created
some head of regions that are genetically potential to become corrupt. These head of regions is usually
very happy with his or her power and tend to abuse his or her power and authority or may also act
arbitrarily. Not only was not innovative, these power-hungry head of regions is indeed not have a
commitment for progress of his or her regions.
There are at least five causes why so many head of regions become suspects in corruption cases in
addition to the high cost of local elections according to Prasojo (2011): (1) the use of discretion by the
head of regions that is not controlled; (2) the oligarchy and dynasty rule; (3) the incompatibility system;
(4) the lack of central government oversight; and (5) the weakness of civil society oversight. What was
mention by Prasojo about the cause of corruption by head of regions in Indonesia is very consistent with
the opinion in most of the literatures on common causes of corruption. From the literatures it is known
that corruption is caused by a number of factors which have contributed either directly or indirectly. In
addition, the factors causing corruption also can be distinguished among the factors associated with
individual characteristics and structural influences.
Opinions about the causes of corruption by direct and indirect factors can be found in the writings of
Tanzi (1998, 565-576). According to Tanzi, there are at least 6 (six) factors as the direct causes of
corruption, namely: (1) regulations and authorizations; (2) taxation; (3) spending decisions; (4)
provisions for goods and services at below-market prices; (5) other discretionary decisions; and (6)
financing of parties. Meanwhile, the indirect cause of corruption consists of at least 6 (six) factors,
namely: (1) quality of the bureaucracy; (2) level of public sector wages; (3) penalty systems; (4)
institutional controls; (5) transparency of rules, laws and processes; and (6) examples by the leadership.
The explanation of the causes of corruption that associated with the characteristics of individual and
structural influences can be seen in the writings of Nas, Price and Weber (1986, 109). According to them,
the individual-level explanation tends to view the corrupt act as the result of greed or the inability to
withstand temptations on the part of weak or insufficiently ethical officials. Greed, or desire for gain, is
indeed a strong motivator of human behavior, as the literature suggest. While the causes of corruption
from the structural side are caused by 3 (three) things: (1) bureaucratic or organizational; (2) quality of
citizen involvement; and (3) congruence of the legal system to social demands.
Meanwhile, in the view of Shah (2007, 236), the occurrence of corruption in the public sector will be
highly dependent on a multitude of factors, namely: (1) the quality of public sector management; (2) the
nature of accountability relations between the government and citizens; (3) the legal framework; and (4)
the degree to which public sector processes are accompanied by transparency and dissemination of
information. Efforts to address corruption that fail to adequately account for these underlying drivers
are unlikely to generate profound and sustainable results.
3. Review on some of corruption cases that involving head of regions after the big bang
decentralization in Indonesia that handled by KPK
In order to achieve the expected goal, I try to describe a number of corruption cases from the Head of
Regions that handled by KPK since 2004-2010. The cases that presented here are cases that has had
permanent legal force and executed. The reason for the selection of the cases that handled by KPK is
based on the availability of information that can be accessed. As known, KPK every year since 2004,
always publish an annual report that it also contains statistical data, description and status of various
cases of corruption that they are handled, including the cases of corruption that involving the Head of
Regions. However, given the fact that KPK is a new institution that just established in December 2003,
the cases handled by them are cases that started from 2004 while the big bang decentralization in
Indonesia has been conducted since January 2001. Therefore, the cases presented here cannot describe
the progress of cases from before 2001 and in the period 2001-2003. From the various cases, then will
be selected 4 cases to be further described. The selection of cases is based on the availability of
information as well as the different types of case.
By referring to the KPK annual reports during 2004-2010, we could obtained information on various
corruption cases that handled by the KPK, as can be seen in table 1. Based on data in table 1, it can be
seen that from 245 corruption cases handled by the KPK since 2004 to 2010, about 30 cases (12.24%)
are the cases that involving the Head of Regions, of which 8 cases involving the Governor and remain 22
cases involving the Regent/Mayor. Where are averaged, each year there are at least 4 cases of
corruption that involving the Head of Regions. This condition is of course very disturbing for us. It is by
remembering that the cases are only the cases that handled by the KPK. There are still some other cases
of corruption by the Head of Regions that handled by the Attorney General Office that its number is
likely far more than the cases that handled by the KPK. This is related to the size of the KPK compared to
the organization of the Attorney General Office. These conditions also troubling because it is also related
to the important role and large function of a Head of Region in the era of regional autonomy. The
involvement of so many Head of Regions in various corruption cases could indicate that they are still
some problematic in the implementation of decentralization in Indonesia. The practice of
decentralization in Indonesia has not been able to support the implementation of good governance. The
successful implementation of decentralization in support of good governance would be marked by small
number of corruption cases that plagued the regional governments, especially that done and involving a
Head of Region. The large number of corruption cases that involving Head of Region have indicated the
persistence of problems that must be corrected in the implementation of decentralization in Indonesia.
As closing remarks, it can be concluded that the implementation of decentralization in Indonesia in
practice has led to many cases of corruption by head of regions. This occurs as a result of the weakness
or absence of legal framework; mechanisms of accountability and transparency in regional government,
role and participation of the community; and monitoring and evaluation system by the central
government. Mechanisms of accountability and transparency as well as the role and participation of the
community are an issue that is relatively less attention so far from government.
In order to reduce the occurrence of corruption committed by head of regions, various improvement
and reinforcement of the weaknesses had to be done. Strengthening mechanisms of accountability,
transparency and public participation should be the main agenda that must be done by governments
and other stakeholders. In addition, improvements to the legal framework and system of monitoring
and evaluation by the central government to regional governments should still be done.
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Indonesian Air Force Projects 10 Fighting Squadrons
Indonesian Air Force Projects 10 Fighting Squadrons
28 jun 2011
Indonesian Air Force (TNI AU) will have 10 fighter sguadron by 2025 (photo : Detik)TEMPO Interactive, Jakarta: The Indonesian Air Force is projecting to improve its military force by 2025, but the plan is hampered by budget issues. Although it has tried to improve the budget, the increase has not been significant.
Indonesian Air Force expert staffer Marshall Parulian Simamora, said the target was to have 10 fighting squadrons, 7 carrier squadrons, 1 VIP/VVIP squadron, 3 strategic spy squadrons, 6 helicopter squadrons, 4 training squadrons, 1 tanker squadron, and 1 PTTA/UAV squadron and military equipment by 2025.
In 2011, the Indonesian Armed Forces was given a Rp44 billion budget, while the Air Force was given Rp7.4 trillion, Rp4.2 trillion of which was used to improve existing military equipment.
Which such budget, the military hopes the national industry can maximize the development of the military and defense equipment industry. Indonesian Air Force chief of staff Marshall Imam Sufaat said a strong local defense industry could reduce dependency on foreign aid.
Imam said the local industry he referred to was not only the plane, rocket, satellite and air balloon manufacturing industry, but also the aviation system industry or airplane component industry. Besides the industry sector, air defense must also be supported by the aviation service, such as air transportation, telecommunication services, flight safety, and maintenance.
PT Dirgantara Indonesia’s Aerostructure director Andi Alisjahbana, said the need for fighting and defense equipment did not always rely on foreign producers. Maintenance and repairs are needed to generate the component industry.
Dirgantara has developed a specific aircraft for the past two years. This year, PT Dirgantara plans to send four aircrafts to South Korea. The four aircrafts, valued at US$100 million, were ordered by the Korean Coast Guard.
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