Tue Jun 28, 2011 10:16am By Epuel Paski
MIDRAND (Reuters) - Calls to nationalise South Africa's mines by factions in the ruling ANC are a front to bail out struggling black-owned companies, Communist Party boss Blade Nzimande said on Tuesday.
The radical Youth League of the ruling African National Congress is pushing for mine nationalisation, unnerving investors in the world's No. 1 platinum producer, but President Jacob Zuma's government insists
it is not government policy. "The call for nationalisation by elements within the ANC Youth League, is to save the black economic empowerment elements in crisis, and not to address the interests of the workers and the poor," Nzimande said at a strategy meeting of leaders affiliated to the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU).
"Ten years from now, they will be calling for privatisation, after the state has inherited the debt," he added.
COSATU and the Communist Party were instrumental in Zuma's rise to power but have been largely unimpressed by his indecisiveness and by corruption within his administration.
Political labels have been rendered topsy-turvy by struggles for spoils and power within the ANC. The Communists are opposed to nationalisation, at least publicly, on the grounds it would promote cronyism without tackling poverty. Unions oppose it as they see it threatening investment and jobs. The Youth League's drive for nationalisation is seen steered in part by stealth-capitalists who could benefit from it.
The ANC elects a new leader next year and Zuma's only chances of retaining the top post rests with the renewed support from his communist and union allies.
Zuma has alienated popular ANC Youth League leader Julius Malema and the millions of poor and disenchanted youngsters he represents by dismissing their drive to get nationalisation accepted as government policy.
Sources in the ANC have said that Malema and the pro-business faction he represents, some who will benefit from nationalisation, want Zuma replaced by a leader who will be more sympathetic to their demands which include seizing white-owned farms without compensation.
On Monday Zuma opened the four-day conference warning union leaders not to overstate their role and make undue demands. COSATU said that Zuma cannot take its support for granted and is likely to wring policy concessions in return for support.
Tuesday, June 28, 2011
Analysis - Foreign worker exodus to spark Malaysian labour crunch
Wed Jun 22, 2011 8:48am
By Epuel Paski
KUALA LUMPUR (Reuters) - Indonesian plumber Yadi has been plying his trade in Malaysia since 2003, part of a two million-strong migrant labour force that forms the backbone of Kuala Lumpur's plantations and construction industries.
But now, the 30-year old wants to go home as wages rise and job opportunities open up in Jakarta, a growing trend among Indonesian workers that analysts say could produce a labour crunch and slower economic growth for Malaysia.
"I have heard a lot from friends and relatives about jobs opening up in my home country, and if I can as easily earn just slightly less in a city like Jakarta compared to what I make now, I will go back," said Yadi, who earns 90 ringgit (18 pounds) a day as a plumber's assistant.
From minding babies to erecting skyscrapers, Malaysia's economy has been supported over the last three decades by a foreign workforce drawn mainly from Indonesia, the Philippines, Bangladesh and Nepal as an industrialisation drive created a wealth of low-paying jobs shunned by locals.
But as more employment opportunities open up in other Asian economies, Malaysia's appeal as a destination for manual jobs is waning.
This, combined with a six-month government programme beginning in July to send home illegal workers, could result in an acute labour shortage.
Under the plan announced on Wednesday, the government will ship home some foreign workers to reduce the number of illegals, although it has yet to determine the number.
"If the government gets it wrong on the labour policy, Malaysia will lose competitiveness in these economic sectors," said Credit Suisse economist Kun Lung Wu.
If you don't get domestic workers to move into these jobs and create higher value, you lose out on the lower cost production segment. Investors won't want come to Malaysia and the pace of economic growth will become slower."
Boosting competitiveness and transforming Malaysia's economy into a high-end manufacturing and services hub is a key plank of Prime Minister Najib Razak's reform agenda.
Najib, who took office two years ago, is betting on a series of structural economic reforms to help Malaysia secure a new niche that can woo back foreign investments which have left for other Asian countries.
SHORTAGES IN PALM OIL SECTOR
Migrant workers, up to two million strong, account for 21 percent of Malaysia's workforce. In particular, the palm oil sector, second only to neighbouring Indonesia in terms of production, relies heavily on foreign labourers.
Eight out of every 10 workers in the plantations sector is a non-Malaysian, according to the Malaysian Employers' Federation and a drop in foreign worker arrivals could further worsen a labour shortage and lower output growth.
As more Malaysian palm oil firms expand in Indonesia to overcome a shortage of land, Indonesians have fewer reasons to seek employment outside their home country.
"Malaysia will soon begin to lose foreign workers from Indonesia as the pace of economic growth in Indonesia will allow an increasing number of Indonesians to find jobs in their own country," said Indonesian embassy spokesman Suryana Satradireja.
Indonesia's economy is forecast by the government and analysts to expand 6.4 percent in 2011, the third-highest in Asia after China and India.
In the construction sector, where two-thirds of the workforce is foreign, a labour crunch could disrupt large government infrastructure projects with a significant multiplier effect, such as a $11.5 billion (7.12 billion pound) rail line.
Many Indonesians also work as domestic helpers. One in every 16 residents in the capital Kuala Lumpur hires an Indonesian helper, according to data from the Indonesian embassy.
Jakarta banned its citizens from working as maids in Malaysia in 2009 following allegations of abuse, but a deal reached in April will pave the way for hiring to begin again.
An Indonesian working as a housemaid in cities like Jakarta can now earn up to 1,000,000 rupiah, equivalent to about $116. That is only slightly less than the salary in Malaysia, without considering other expenses incurred by foreigners, Suryana said.
Analysts say Malaysia can plug any gap in labour needs by sourcing from other countries.
But such a solution would only be temporary and efforts must be directed at avoiding the "middle income trap" -- under which Malaysia finds itself unable to move beyond its low-end manufacturing niche to become a developed economy.
"It is vital that Malaysia overcome its reliance on cheap foreign workers so as to avoid the middle income trap," said Manu Bhaskaran, chief executive of Centennial Asia Advisors in Singapore, which advises on economics and policy.
(Additional reporting by Niluksi Koswanage; editing by Liau Y-Sing and Ron Popeski)
By Epuel Paski
KUALA LUMPUR (Reuters) - Indonesian plumber Yadi has been plying his trade in Malaysia since 2003, part of a two million-strong migrant labour force that forms the backbone of Kuala Lumpur's plantations and construction industries.
But now, the 30-year old wants to go home as wages rise and job opportunities open up in Jakarta, a growing trend among Indonesian workers that analysts say could produce a labour crunch and slower economic growth for Malaysia.
"I have heard a lot from friends and relatives about jobs opening up in my home country, and if I can as easily earn just slightly less in a city like Jakarta compared to what I make now, I will go back," said Yadi, who earns 90 ringgit (18 pounds) a day as a plumber's assistant.
From minding babies to erecting skyscrapers, Malaysia's economy has been supported over the last three decades by a foreign workforce drawn mainly from Indonesia, the Philippines, Bangladesh and Nepal as an industrialisation drive created a wealth of low-paying jobs shunned by locals.
But as more employment opportunities open up in other Asian economies, Malaysia's appeal as a destination for manual jobs is waning.
This, combined with a six-month government programme beginning in July to send home illegal workers, could result in an acute labour shortage.
Under the plan announced on Wednesday, the government will ship home some foreign workers to reduce the number of illegals, although it has yet to determine the number.
"If the government gets it wrong on the labour policy, Malaysia will lose competitiveness in these economic sectors," said Credit Suisse economist Kun Lung Wu.
If you don't get domestic workers to move into these jobs and create higher value, you lose out on the lower cost production segment. Investors won't want come to Malaysia and the pace of economic growth will become slower."
Boosting competitiveness and transforming Malaysia's economy into a high-end manufacturing and services hub is a key plank of Prime Minister Najib Razak's reform agenda.
Najib, who took office two years ago, is betting on a series of structural economic reforms to help Malaysia secure a new niche that can woo back foreign investments which have left for other Asian countries.
SHORTAGES IN PALM OIL SECTOR
Migrant workers, up to two million strong, account for 21 percent of Malaysia's workforce. In particular, the palm oil sector, second only to neighbouring Indonesia in terms of production, relies heavily on foreign labourers.
Eight out of every 10 workers in the plantations sector is a non-Malaysian, according to the Malaysian Employers' Federation and a drop in foreign worker arrivals could further worsen a labour shortage and lower output growth.
As more Malaysian palm oil firms expand in Indonesia to overcome a shortage of land, Indonesians have fewer reasons to seek employment outside their home country.
"Malaysia will soon begin to lose foreign workers from Indonesia as the pace of economic growth in Indonesia will allow an increasing number of Indonesians to find jobs in their own country," said Indonesian embassy spokesman Suryana Satradireja.
Indonesia's economy is forecast by the government and analysts to expand 6.4 percent in 2011, the third-highest in Asia after China and India.
In the construction sector, where two-thirds of the workforce is foreign, a labour crunch could disrupt large government infrastructure projects with a significant multiplier effect, such as a $11.5 billion (7.12 billion pound) rail line.
Many Indonesians also work as domestic helpers. One in every 16 residents in the capital Kuala Lumpur hires an Indonesian helper, according to data from the Indonesian embassy.
Jakarta banned its citizens from working as maids in Malaysia in 2009 following allegations of abuse, but a deal reached in April will pave the way for hiring to begin again.
An Indonesian working as a housemaid in cities like Jakarta can now earn up to 1,000,000 rupiah, equivalent to about $116. That is only slightly less than the salary in Malaysia, without considering other expenses incurred by foreigners, Suryana said.
Analysts say Malaysia can plug any gap in labour needs by sourcing from other countries.
But such a solution would only be temporary and efforts must be directed at avoiding the "middle income trap" -- under which Malaysia finds itself unable to move beyond its low-end manufacturing niche to become a developed economy.
"It is vital that Malaysia overcome its reliance on cheap foreign workers so as to avoid the middle income trap," said Manu Bhaskaran, chief executive of Centennial Asia Advisors in Singapore, which advises on economics and policy.
(Additional reporting by Niluksi Koswanage; editing by Liau Y-Sing and Ron Popeski)
DEMOCRATIC DECENTRALIZATION
Abstract
In one study, James Manor (1999, 101-102) stressed that democratic decentralization is always attended
by an increase in the number of persons who are involved in corrupt acts. This situation according to
Manor can be prevented if strong, democratic, decentralized institutions are allowed to function for
extended periods through a combination of processes: with democratic institutions stimulating (as they
do) the development of civil society; while organized interests, the press, and others acquire skills and
the inclination to make the system work well. In the context of Indonesia, the latest developments
indicates as revealed by the Minister of Home Affairs in a working meeting with the Regional
Representatives Council on January 17, 2011 that so far there are 17 governors (of 33) and 138
regents/mayor (of 497) who became a suspect in criminal cases, especially in corruption case. There are
at least three main causes why those Head of Regions entry into the trap of corruption, namely: due
process of procurement of goods and services through a kickback, mark up, bribery and embezzlement;
due to abuse of social assistance funds through a fictitious proposal, embezzlement and enrich others
parties as well as due to the process of granting certain permissions. Contextually, this situation
occurred due to a very large discretion of the Head of Regions in the management of Local Budgets that
ranging from the budgeting process, utilization and accountability that are laden with his or her political
interests. Corruption occurs commonly associated with leakage in the use of the budget, particularly
from the revenue and spending. This paper tries to discuss, analyze and give an answer why it has
happened and the various efforts that can be done to fix it. Through the literature study, this paper will
attempt to describe the current condition of a number of corruption cases that involving the Head of
Regions in Indonesia.
Keywords: Democratic Decentralization; Corruption; Indonesia; Head of Regions
1. Introduction
In the context of governance, a regional government is considered to assist in the creation of
governance. This can be seen from many expert opinions as quoted by Campos and Hellman (2005 in
World Bank, 2005, 237) that decentralization will make local officials more accountable to constituents
for their performance. However, these conditions cannot simply be achieved. There are a number of
conditions that must be met in order to realize governance in the regional administration, including
establishing mechanisms to promote broad civic participation and more responsive and accountable
local governments (Wong and Guggenheim, 2005 in World Bank, 2005, 253). In addition, according to
Azfar et al (1999, 1) devolution should increase the accountability of government officials and
discourage most forms of corruption where government actions are transparent and civil society is
permitted to operate freely.
* Paper presented at the 2011 Conference on Decentralization and Democratization in Southeast Asia, held by the
Freiburg Southeast Asia Study Group, University of Freiburg, Freiburg, Germany, June 15-17, 2011.
The importance of the mechanism as disclosed by experts above cannot be separated from the fact that
the decentralization also provides greater opportunities for corruption. This is as presented by Monte
and Papagni (2007, 381) by citing opinion from Prud’home (1995) and Tanzi (1995) that corruption may
be greater at the local level because of the greater intimacy and frequency of interaction between
private individuals and officials at more decentralized levels.
Associated with this condition, in one study, James Manor (1999, 101-102) stressed that democratic
decentralization is always attended by an increase in the number of persons who are involved in corrupt
acts. This situation according to Manor can be prevented if strong, democratic, decentralized institutions
are allowed to function for extended periods through a combination of processes: with democratic
institutions stimulating (as they do) the development of civil society; while organized interests, the
press, and others acquire skills and the inclination to make the system work well.
In the context of Indonesia, the latest developments indicates as revealed by the Minister of Home
Affairs in a working meeting with the Regional Representatives Council on January 17, 2011 that so far
there are 17 governors (of 33) and 138 regents/mayor (of 497) who became a suspect in criminal cases,
especially in corruption case. These facts emphasize the condition as expressed by various experts that
the implementation of decentralization in Indonesia was marked by the increasing corruption in
Regional Government. Rinaldi, Purnomo, and Damayanti (2007) for example, revealed that even since
the enactment of Regional Autonomy under the Law No. 22 year 1999 on Regional Government in the
year 2001 there have been trends of corruption in Regional Government which has increased sharply.
This condition occurs according to Chaniago (2004 as quoted in Koran Tempo) as a result of increased
legislative and executive powers in the regions that are not accompanied by a transparent accountability
mechanism to the public.
In connection with a corruption case that involving a number of Head of Regions as disclosed above,
based on data from a number of corruption cases related to Head of Regions that handled by Komisi
Pemberantasan Korupsi (KPK/Corruption Eradication Commission) for example (see Table 2), there are
at least three main causes why those Head of Regions entry into the trap of corruption, namely: due
process of procurement of goods and services through a kickback, mark up, bribery and embezzlement;
due to abuse of social assistance funds through a fictitious proposal, embezzlement and enrich others
parties as well as due to the process of granting certain permissions. Contextually, this situation
occurred due to a very large discretion of the Head of Regions in the management of Local Budgets that
ranging from the budgeting process, utilization and accountability that are laden with his or her political
interests. Corruption occurs commonly associated with leakage in the use of the budget, particularly
from the revenue and spending.
Departing from diverse backgrounds above, this paper tries to discuss, analyze and give an answer why
the situation has happened and the various efforts that can be done to fix it. Through the literature
study, this paper will attempt to describe the current condition of a number of corruption cases that
involving the Head of Regions in Indonesia, especially from the cases that handled by the KPK. In order
to achieve its goal, this paper consists of several parts. The first section will describe the background of
why this theme was raised. The second part will discuss the conceptual study of decentralization and its
relation to corruption. The third section will discuss about some of corruption cases that involving heads
of regions after the big bang decentralization in Indonesia that handheld by the KPK. The fourth section
will analyze the cases and efforts in the future that can be done to prevent it. And the last or fifth part
will contain the conclusions and recommendations related to policies that must be taken to reduce the
occurrence of similar cases.
2. Conceptualization of decentralization and its link with corruption
According to Bjedov, Madies and Schnyder (2010, 13), the study of the link between decentralization
and corruption is the object of a relatively recent and expanding literature even though we can already
find tracks of this debate in the work of authors such as Brennan and Buchanan (1977; 1980). Related to
this, in the end there are two different views about the linkages between decentralization and
corruption. First view assumes that decentralization can impact positively on the corruption, while
others view consider that decentralization would give a negative impact on corruption. The second view
in my opinion is more due to the non-fulfillment of a number of requirements that should exist in the
implementation of a decentralized policy so that decentralization is actually expected to support the
creation of good governance but in the end it turned out creates conditions for bad governance, which
marked one of them with increasing corruption.
Related to this, the successful implementation of decentralization according to Rondinelli, Nellis and
Cheema (1983, 34-35) will be determined by at least 6 (six) factors, namely: (1) the degree to which
decentralization contributes to achieving broad political objectives, such as promoting political stability;
mobilizing support and cooperation for national development policies; and providing heterogeneous
regions, interests, and communities with a stake in the survival of the political system; (2) the degree to
which decentralization increases administrative effectiveness, by promoting greater coordination among
units of the national government and between them and sub-national administrative units, local
governments, and nongovernmental organizations, or by encouraging closer cooperation among
organizations to attain mutually acceptable development goals; (3) the degree to which decentralization
contributes to promoting economic and managerial efficiency, by allowing government at both the
central and local levels to achieve development goals in a more cost-effective manner; (4) the degree to
which decentralization increases government responsiveness to the needs and demands of various
interest groups within society; (5) the degree to which decentralization contributes to greater selfdetermination
and self-reliance among subordinate units of administration or nongovernment
organizations in promoting development or meeting highly valued needs within society; and (6) The
appropriateness of the means by which policies and programs are designed and carried out to achieve
the goals of decentralization, however they are defined.
In line with the views from Rondinelli, Nellis and Cheema, Kauzya (2005, 9-10) offers 5 (five)
characteristics that should be considered in designing democratic decentralization policy which are: (1)
legal framework: instituting constitutional and legal reforms to devolve power to local structures; (2)
local governance capacity: increasing local governance actors’ ability to act (financial and human
resources, organization, authority); (3) increasing local government accountability; (4) role of civil
society (practice of horizontal decentralization /community empowerment); and (5) socio-economic well
being: (improving quality of life).
To be able to make decentralization can support the creation of good governance particularly in
improving the effectiveness and accountability, then according to Manor (1999) as cited by Johnson
(2001, 527) elected bodies at local levels have adequate funds; they enjoy substantive autonomy; and
lines of accountability exist between elected representatives and citizens, and between non-elected
bureaucrats and elected representatives. In line with Manor opinion, according to the World Bank
Institute (2001, 8) to improve governance and fighting corruption in local governments can be done
through local government reforms that related to simplified administrative procedures; increased citizen
participation in government; and monitoring and evaluation systems. This reform in local government is
part of the reforms implemented nationally.
In terms of accountability, according to Shah (1998, 15) is the key to the success of decentralized
decision making. However it entails institutions and mechanisms for citizen’s voice and exit, norms and
networks of civic engagement; social consensus; preservation instinct of a "stationary bandit" who
monopolizes and rationalizes theft in the form of taxes; judicial accountability; vertical and horizontal
accountability. Meanwhile, regarding public participation according to Shah (1998, 21) is an instrument
that can ensures that public goods are consistent with voter preferences and public sector
accountability. Such participation is possible only if political freedom (voice and exit) is permitted and
political stability prevails. Decentralization strengthens citizen participation by bringing governments
closer to the people they are intended to serve.
In the context of decentralization in Indonesia since the Law No. 22 year 1999 to Law No. 32 year 2004 is
turned out not to produce maximum results, otherwise even the majority showed an indication of
failure (Prasojo, 2009, 121). The failure of this regional autonomy according to Prasojo (2009, 122) is
reflected in an absence of the dimensions of political of equality, local responsiveness and local
accountability in government efficiency, public service, financial management, management of natural
resources, and direct election of head of regions. Further according to Prasojo (2011), in addition to
producing head of regions that innovative and pro- local progress, regional autonomy has also created
some head of regions that are genetically potential to become corrupt. These head of regions is usually
very happy with his or her power and tend to abuse his or her power and authority or may also act
arbitrarily. Not only was not innovative, these power-hungry head of regions is indeed not have a
commitment for progress of his or her regions.
There are at least five causes why so many head of regions become suspects in corruption cases in
addition to the high cost of local elections according to Prasojo (2011): (1) the use of discretion by the
head of regions that is not controlled; (2) the oligarchy and dynasty rule; (3) the incompatibility system;
(4) the lack of central government oversight; and (5) the weakness of civil society oversight. What was
mention by Prasojo about the cause of corruption by head of regions in Indonesia is very consistent with
the opinion in most of the literatures on common causes of corruption. From the literatures it is known
that corruption is caused by a number of factors which have contributed either directly or indirectly. In
addition, the factors causing corruption also can be distinguished among the factors associated with
individual characteristics and structural influences.
Opinions about the causes of corruption by direct and indirect factors can be found in the writings of
Tanzi (1998, 565-576). According to Tanzi, there are at least 6 (six) factors as the direct causes of
corruption, namely: (1) regulations and authorizations; (2) taxation; (3) spending decisions; (4)
provisions for goods and services at below-market prices; (5) other discretionary decisions; and (6)
financing of parties. Meanwhile, the indirect cause of corruption consists of at least 6 (six) factors,
namely: (1) quality of the bureaucracy; (2) level of public sector wages; (3) penalty systems; (4)
institutional controls; (5) transparency of rules, laws and processes; and (6) examples by the leadership.
The explanation of the causes of corruption that associated with the characteristics of individual and
structural influences can be seen in the writings of Nas, Price and Weber (1986, 109). According to them,
the individual-level explanation tends to view the corrupt act as the result of greed or the inability to
withstand temptations on the part of weak or insufficiently ethical officials. Greed, or desire for gain, is
indeed a strong motivator of human behavior, as the literature suggest. While the causes of corruption
from the structural side are caused by 3 (three) things: (1) bureaucratic or organizational; (2) quality of
citizen involvement; and (3) congruence of the legal system to social demands.
Meanwhile, in the view of Shah (2007, 236), the occurrence of corruption in the public sector will be
highly dependent on a multitude of factors, namely: (1) the quality of public sector management; (2) the
nature of accountability relations between the government and citizens; (3) the legal framework; and (4)
the degree to which public sector processes are accompanied by transparency and dissemination of
information. Efforts to address corruption that fail to adequately account for these underlying drivers
are unlikely to generate profound and sustainable results.
3. Review on some of corruption cases that involving head of regions after the big bang
decentralization in Indonesia that handled by KPK
In order to achieve the expected goal, I try to describe a number of corruption cases from the Head of
Regions that handled by KPK since 2004-2010. The cases that presented here are cases that has had
permanent legal force and executed. The reason for the selection of the cases that handled by KPK is
based on the availability of information that can be accessed. As known, KPK every year since 2004,
always publish an annual report that it also contains statistical data, description and status of various
cases of corruption that they are handled, including the cases of corruption that involving the Head of
Regions. However, given the fact that KPK is a new institution that just established in December 2003,
the cases handled by them are cases that started from 2004 while the big bang decentralization in
Indonesia has been conducted since January 2001. Therefore, the cases presented here cannot describe
the progress of cases from before 2001 and in the period 2001-2003. From the various cases, then will
be selected 4 cases to be further described. The selection of cases is based on the availability of
information as well as the different types of case.
By referring to the KPK annual reports during 2004-2010, we could obtained information on various
corruption cases that handled by the KPK, as can be seen in table 1. Based on data in table 1, it can be
seen that from 245 corruption cases handled by the KPK since 2004 to 2010, about 30 cases (12.24%)
are the cases that involving the Head of Regions, of which 8 cases involving the Governor and remain 22
cases involving the Regent/Mayor. Where are averaged, each year there are at least 4 cases of
corruption that involving the Head of Regions. This condition is of course very disturbing for us. It is by
remembering that the cases are only the cases that handled by the KPK. There are still some other cases
of corruption by the Head of Regions that handled by the Attorney General Office that its number is
likely far more than the cases that handled by the KPK. This is related to the size of the KPK compared to
the organization of the Attorney General Office. These conditions also troubling because it is also related
to the important role and large function of a Head of Region in the era of regional autonomy. The
involvement of so many Head of Regions in various corruption cases could indicate that they are still
some problematic in the implementation of decentralization in Indonesia. The practice of
decentralization in Indonesia has not been able to support the implementation of good governance. The
successful implementation of decentralization in support of good governance would be marked by small
number of corruption cases that plagued the regional governments, especially that done and involving a
Head of Region. The large number of corruption cases that involving Head of Region have indicated the
persistence of problems that must be corrected in the implementation of decentralization in Indonesia.
As closing remarks, it can be concluded that the implementation of decentralization in Indonesia in
practice has led to many cases of corruption by head of regions. This occurs as a result of the weakness
or absence of legal framework; mechanisms of accountability and transparency in regional government,
role and participation of the community; and monitoring and evaluation system by the central
government. Mechanisms of accountability and transparency as well as the role and participation of the
community are an issue that is relatively less attention so far from government.
In order to reduce the occurrence of corruption committed by head of regions, various improvement
and reinforcement of the weaknesses had to be done. Strengthening mechanisms of accountability,
transparency and public participation should be the main agenda that must be done by governments
and other stakeholders. In addition, improvements to the legal framework and system of monitoring
and evaluation by the central government to regional governments should still be done.
References
Azfar, Omar, Satu Kahkonen, Anthony Lanyi, Patrick Meagher and Diana Rutherford. (1999).
“Decentralization, Governance and Public Services The Impact of Intitutional Arrangements: A
Review of the Literature”. IRIS Center, University of Maryland, pp. 1-35
Bjedov, Tjasa, Thierry Madies and Simon Schnyder. (2010). “Corruption and Decentralization: What
Economists Have to Say about It”, Urban Public Economics Review, No. 3, pp. 12-33
Callahan, Kathe. (2007). Elements of Effective Governance: Measurement, Accountability and
Participation, Florida: CRC Taylor & Francis Group
Kauzya, John-Mary. (2005). “Decentralization: Prospects for Peace, democracy and Development”,
DPADM Discussion paper, DPADM, DESA, UN, pp. 1-18
Johnson, Craig. (2001). “Local Democracy, Democratic Decentralisation and Rural Development:
Theories, Challenges and Options for Policy”, Development Policy Review, Volume 19, No. 4, pp.
521-532
Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (KPK/Corruption Eradication Commission). (2011). “Kajian Kebijakan
Pengelolaan Belanja Bantuan Sosial di Pemerintahan Daerah”, Bahan Paparan, Jakarta, 5 April
2011 (Study on Management Policy of Social Assistance Expenditures by Regional Government,
Material Exposure that presented on April, 5, 2011)
______________. (2010). Laporan tahunan/Annual Report 2010, Jakarta: KPK
______________. (2009). Laporan tahunan/Annual Report 2009, Jakarta: KPK
______________. (2008). Laporan tahunan/Annual Report 2008, Jakarta: KPK
______________. (2007). Laporan tahunan/Annual Report 2007, Jakarta: KPK
______________. (2006). Laporan tahunan/Annual Report 2006, Jakarta: KPK
______________. (2005). Laporan tahunan/Annual Report 2005, Jakarta: KPK
______________. (2004). Laporan tahunan/Annual Report 2004, Jakarta: KPK
Mahkamah Agung (Supreme Court). (2007). Putusan/Verdict No. 380 K/Pid.Sus/2007
Manor, James. (1999). “The Political Economy of Democratic Decentralization, Washington DC: World
Bank
Monte, Alfredo Del and Erasmo Papagni. (2007). “The determinants of corruption in Italy: Regional panel
data analysis”, European Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 23, Issue. 2, pp 379-396
Nas, Tevfik F, Albert C Price, and Charles T Weber. (1986). “A Policy-Oriented Theory of Corruption”, The
American Political Science Review, Vol 80, No. 1, pp. 107-119
Prasojo, Eko. (2011). “Republik Tersandera Korupsi”, Kompas, 24 Januari 2011 (Republic that hostage by
corruption, opinion in Kompas newspaper)
______________. (2009). Reformasi Kedua: Melanjutkan Estafet Reformasi, Jakarta: Penerbit Salemba
Humanika (Second Reform: Continuing the Reform Relay)
______________. (2008). “Mainstreaming Decentralized Governance in Indonesia”, Program
Documents, unpublished
Prasojo, Eko, et al. (2010). “Dampak Desentralisasi terhadap Pemanfaatan Sumber Daya Alam dan
Kerusakan Lingkungan”, Laporan Penelitian, Depok: Universitas Indonesia (Impact of
Decentralization on the Utilization of Natural Resources and Environmental Degradation, research
report)
Rondinelli, Dennis A, John R Nellis dan G Shabbir Cheema. (1983). Decentralization in Developing
Countries: A Review of Recent Experience, Washington DC: World Bank
Shah, Anwar. (Editor). (2007). Performance Accountability and Combating Corruption, Washington DC:
The World Bank
______________. (1998). “Balance, Accountability, and Responsiveness: Lessons about
Decentralization”, Policy Research Working Paper, No. 2021, World Bank, pp. 1-41
Tanzi, Vito. (1998). “Corruption around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cures”, IMF Staff
Papers, Vol. 45, No. 4, pp. 559-594
World Bank. (2005) East Asia Decentralize: Making Local Government Work. Washington DC: The World
Bank
World Bank Institute (WBI). (2001). Improving Governance and Controlling Corruption: Towards a
participatory and action-oriented approach grounded on empirical rigor, Washington DC: World
Bank
Kompas, 6 April 2001, “Penggunaan dana bantuan sosial yang bersumber dari APBD atau APBN rawan di
korupsi” (the use of social assistance funds sourced from local or national budgets is corruption
prone)
Kompas, 26 Maret 2011, “Kasus Korupsi Kehutanan: Bupati Siak Arwin AS ditahan KPK” (Corruption case
in forestry: Regent of Siak Arwin AS detained by KPK)
Kompas, 18 Januari 2001, “17 Gubernur berstatus tersangka” (17 Governor got suspect status)
Koran Tempo, 6 April 2011, “KPK: Dana Sosial Rawan di korupsi” (KPK: Social Funds is Corruption Prone)
Media Indonesia, 9 Maret 2011, “Kepala Daerah Banyak Korupsi Pengadaan” (Head of regions much
corrupt on procurement)
Media Indonesia, 25 Februari 2011, “Sejumlah Kepala Daerah Diduga Terkait Korupsi” (a number of head
of regions allegedly related to corruption)
http://www.tempo.co.id/hg/narasi/2004/11/04/nrs,20041104-01,id.html (Desentralisasi Korupsi
Melalui Otonomi Daerah/Decentralization Corruption through Regional Autonomy)
http://acch.kpk.go.id/web/guest/samsuri-aspar
http://acch.kpk.go.id/web/guest/abdillah
http://acch.kpk.go.id/web/guest/jimmy-rimba-rogi
In one study, James Manor (1999, 101-102) stressed that democratic decentralization is always attended
by an increase in the number of persons who are involved in corrupt acts. This situation according to
Manor can be prevented if strong, democratic, decentralized institutions are allowed to function for
extended periods through a combination of processes: with democratic institutions stimulating (as they
do) the development of civil society; while organized interests, the press, and others acquire skills and
the inclination to make the system work well. In the context of Indonesia, the latest developments
indicates as revealed by the Minister of Home Affairs in a working meeting with the Regional
Representatives Council on January 17, 2011 that so far there are 17 governors (of 33) and 138
regents/mayor (of 497) who became a suspect in criminal cases, especially in corruption case. There are
at least three main causes why those Head of Regions entry into the trap of corruption, namely: due
process of procurement of goods and services through a kickback, mark up, bribery and embezzlement;
due to abuse of social assistance funds through a fictitious proposal, embezzlement and enrich others
parties as well as due to the process of granting certain permissions. Contextually, this situation
occurred due to a very large discretion of the Head of Regions in the management of Local Budgets that
ranging from the budgeting process, utilization and accountability that are laden with his or her political
interests. Corruption occurs commonly associated with leakage in the use of the budget, particularly
from the revenue and spending. This paper tries to discuss, analyze and give an answer why it has
happened and the various efforts that can be done to fix it. Through the literature study, this paper will
attempt to describe the current condition of a number of corruption cases that involving the Head of
Regions in Indonesia.
Keywords: Democratic Decentralization; Corruption; Indonesia; Head of Regions
1. Introduction
In the context of governance, a regional government is considered to assist in the creation of
governance. This can be seen from many expert opinions as quoted by Campos and Hellman (2005 in
World Bank, 2005, 237) that decentralization will make local officials more accountable to constituents
for their performance. However, these conditions cannot simply be achieved. There are a number of
conditions that must be met in order to realize governance in the regional administration, including
establishing mechanisms to promote broad civic participation and more responsive and accountable
local governments (Wong and Guggenheim, 2005 in World Bank, 2005, 253). In addition, according to
Azfar et al (1999, 1) devolution should increase the accountability of government officials and
discourage most forms of corruption where government actions are transparent and civil society is
permitted to operate freely.
* Paper presented at the 2011 Conference on Decentralization and Democratization in Southeast Asia, held by the
Freiburg Southeast Asia Study Group, University of Freiburg, Freiburg, Germany, June 15-17, 2011.
The importance of the mechanism as disclosed by experts above cannot be separated from the fact that
the decentralization also provides greater opportunities for corruption. This is as presented by Monte
and Papagni (2007, 381) by citing opinion from Prud’home (1995) and Tanzi (1995) that corruption may
be greater at the local level because of the greater intimacy and frequency of interaction between
private individuals and officials at more decentralized levels.
Associated with this condition, in one study, James Manor (1999, 101-102) stressed that democratic
decentralization is always attended by an increase in the number of persons who are involved in corrupt
acts. This situation according to Manor can be prevented if strong, democratic, decentralized institutions
are allowed to function for extended periods through a combination of processes: with democratic
institutions stimulating (as they do) the development of civil society; while organized interests, the
press, and others acquire skills and the inclination to make the system work well.
In the context of Indonesia, the latest developments indicates as revealed by the Minister of Home
Affairs in a working meeting with the Regional Representatives Council on January 17, 2011 that so far
there are 17 governors (of 33) and 138 regents/mayor (of 497) who became a suspect in criminal cases,
especially in corruption case. These facts emphasize the condition as expressed by various experts that
the implementation of decentralization in Indonesia was marked by the increasing corruption in
Regional Government. Rinaldi, Purnomo, and Damayanti (2007) for example, revealed that even since
the enactment of Regional Autonomy under the Law No. 22 year 1999 on Regional Government in the
year 2001 there have been trends of corruption in Regional Government which has increased sharply.
This condition occurs according to Chaniago (2004 as quoted in Koran Tempo) as a result of increased
legislative and executive powers in the regions that are not accompanied by a transparent accountability
mechanism to the public.
In connection with a corruption case that involving a number of Head of Regions as disclosed above,
based on data from a number of corruption cases related to Head of Regions that handled by Komisi
Pemberantasan Korupsi (KPK/Corruption Eradication Commission) for example (see Table 2), there are
at least three main causes why those Head of Regions entry into the trap of corruption, namely: due
process of procurement of goods and services through a kickback, mark up, bribery and embezzlement;
due to abuse of social assistance funds through a fictitious proposal, embezzlement and enrich others
parties as well as due to the process of granting certain permissions. Contextually, this situation
occurred due to a very large discretion of the Head of Regions in the management of Local Budgets that
ranging from the budgeting process, utilization and accountability that are laden with his or her political
interests. Corruption occurs commonly associated with leakage in the use of the budget, particularly
from the revenue and spending.
Departing from diverse backgrounds above, this paper tries to discuss, analyze and give an answer why
the situation has happened and the various efforts that can be done to fix it. Through the literature
study, this paper will attempt to describe the current condition of a number of corruption cases that
involving the Head of Regions in Indonesia, especially from the cases that handled by the KPK. In order
to achieve its goal, this paper consists of several parts. The first section will describe the background of
why this theme was raised. The second part will discuss the conceptual study of decentralization and its
relation to corruption. The third section will discuss about some of corruption cases that involving heads
of regions after the big bang decentralization in Indonesia that handheld by the KPK. The fourth section
will analyze the cases and efforts in the future that can be done to prevent it. And the last or fifth part
will contain the conclusions and recommendations related to policies that must be taken to reduce the
occurrence of similar cases.
2. Conceptualization of decentralization and its link with corruption
According to Bjedov, Madies and Schnyder (2010, 13), the study of the link between decentralization
and corruption is the object of a relatively recent and expanding literature even though we can already
find tracks of this debate in the work of authors such as Brennan and Buchanan (1977; 1980). Related to
this, in the end there are two different views about the linkages between decentralization and
corruption. First view assumes that decentralization can impact positively on the corruption, while
others view consider that decentralization would give a negative impact on corruption. The second view
in my opinion is more due to the non-fulfillment of a number of requirements that should exist in the
implementation of a decentralized policy so that decentralization is actually expected to support the
creation of good governance but in the end it turned out creates conditions for bad governance, which
marked one of them with increasing corruption.
Related to this, the successful implementation of decentralization according to Rondinelli, Nellis and
Cheema (1983, 34-35) will be determined by at least 6 (six) factors, namely: (1) the degree to which
decentralization contributes to achieving broad political objectives, such as promoting political stability;
mobilizing support and cooperation for national development policies; and providing heterogeneous
regions, interests, and communities with a stake in the survival of the political system; (2) the degree to
which decentralization increases administrative effectiveness, by promoting greater coordination among
units of the national government and between them and sub-national administrative units, local
governments, and nongovernmental organizations, or by encouraging closer cooperation among
organizations to attain mutually acceptable development goals; (3) the degree to which decentralization
contributes to promoting economic and managerial efficiency, by allowing government at both the
central and local levels to achieve development goals in a more cost-effective manner; (4) the degree to
which decentralization increases government responsiveness to the needs and demands of various
interest groups within society; (5) the degree to which decentralization contributes to greater selfdetermination
and self-reliance among subordinate units of administration or nongovernment
organizations in promoting development or meeting highly valued needs within society; and (6) The
appropriateness of the means by which policies and programs are designed and carried out to achieve
the goals of decentralization, however they are defined.
In line with the views from Rondinelli, Nellis and Cheema, Kauzya (2005, 9-10) offers 5 (five)
characteristics that should be considered in designing democratic decentralization policy which are: (1)
legal framework: instituting constitutional and legal reforms to devolve power to local structures; (2)
local governance capacity: increasing local governance actors’ ability to act (financial and human
resources, organization, authority); (3) increasing local government accountability; (4) role of civil
society (practice of horizontal decentralization /community empowerment); and (5) socio-economic well
being: (improving quality of life).
To be able to make decentralization can support the creation of good governance particularly in
improving the effectiveness and accountability, then according to Manor (1999) as cited by Johnson
(2001, 527) elected bodies at local levels have adequate funds; they enjoy substantive autonomy; and
lines of accountability exist between elected representatives and citizens, and between non-elected
bureaucrats and elected representatives. In line with Manor opinion, according to the World Bank
Institute (2001, 8) to improve governance and fighting corruption in local governments can be done
through local government reforms that related to simplified administrative procedures; increased citizen
participation in government; and monitoring and evaluation systems. This reform in local government is
part of the reforms implemented nationally.
In terms of accountability, according to Shah (1998, 15) is the key to the success of decentralized
decision making. However it entails institutions and mechanisms for citizen’s voice and exit, norms and
networks of civic engagement; social consensus; preservation instinct of a "stationary bandit" who
monopolizes and rationalizes theft in the form of taxes; judicial accountability; vertical and horizontal
accountability. Meanwhile, regarding public participation according to Shah (1998, 21) is an instrument
that can ensures that public goods are consistent with voter preferences and public sector
accountability. Such participation is possible only if political freedom (voice and exit) is permitted and
political stability prevails. Decentralization strengthens citizen participation by bringing governments
closer to the people they are intended to serve.
In the context of decentralization in Indonesia since the Law No. 22 year 1999 to Law No. 32 year 2004 is
turned out not to produce maximum results, otherwise even the majority showed an indication of
failure (Prasojo, 2009, 121). The failure of this regional autonomy according to Prasojo (2009, 122) is
reflected in an absence of the dimensions of political of equality, local responsiveness and local
accountability in government efficiency, public service, financial management, management of natural
resources, and direct election of head of regions. Further according to Prasojo (2011), in addition to
producing head of regions that innovative and pro- local progress, regional autonomy has also created
some head of regions that are genetically potential to become corrupt. These head of regions is usually
very happy with his or her power and tend to abuse his or her power and authority or may also act
arbitrarily. Not only was not innovative, these power-hungry head of regions is indeed not have a
commitment for progress of his or her regions.
There are at least five causes why so many head of regions become suspects in corruption cases in
addition to the high cost of local elections according to Prasojo (2011): (1) the use of discretion by the
head of regions that is not controlled; (2) the oligarchy and dynasty rule; (3) the incompatibility system;
(4) the lack of central government oversight; and (5) the weakness of civil society oversight. What was
mention by Prasojo about the cause of corruption by head of regions in Indonesia is very consistent with
the opinion in most of the literatures on common causes of corruption. From the literatures it is known
that corruption is caused by a number of factors which have contributed either directly or indirectly. In
addition, the factors causing corruption also can be distinguished among the factors associated with
individual characteristics and structural influences.
Opinions about the causes of corruption by direct and indirect factors can be found in the writings of
Tanzi (1998, 565-576). According to Tanzi, there are at least 6 (six) factors as the direct causes of
corruption, namely: (1) regulations and authorizations; (2) taxation; (3) spending decisions; (4)
provisions for goods and services at below-market prices; (5) other discretionary decisions; and (6)
financing of parties. Meanwhile, the indirect cause of corruption consists of at least 6 (six) factors,
namely: (1) quality of the bureaucracy; (2) level of public sector wages; (3) penalty systems; (4)
institutional controls; (5) transparency of rules, laws and processes; and (6) examples by the leadership.
The explanation of the causes of corruption that associated with the characteristics of individual and
structural influences can be seen in the writings of Nas, Price and Weber (1986, 109). According to them,
the individual-level explanation tends to view the corrupt act as the result of greed or the inability to
withstand temptations on the part of weak or insufficiently ethical officials. Greed, or desire for gain, is
indeed a strong motivator of human behavior, as the literature suggest. While the causes of corruption
from the structural side are caused by 3 (three) things: (1) bureaucratic or organizational; (2) quality of
citizen involvement; and (3) congruence of the legal system to social demands.
Meanwhile, in the view of Shah (2007, 236), the occurrence of corruption in the public sector will be
highly dependent on a multitude of factors, namely: (1) the quality of public sector management; (2) the
nature of accountability relations between the government and citizens; (3) the legal framework; and (4)
the degree to which public sector processes are accompanied by transparency and dissemination of
information. Efforts to address corruption that fail to adequately account for these underlying drivers
are unlikely to generate profound and sustainable results.
3. Review on some of corruption cases that involving head of regions after the big bang
decentralization in Indonesia that handled by KPK
In order to achieve the expected goal, I try to describe a number of corruption cases from the Head of
Regions that handled by KPK since 2004-2010. The cases that presented here are cases that has had
permanent legal force and executed. The reason for the selection of the cases that handled by KPK is
based on the availability of information that can be accessed. As known, KPK every year since 2004,
always publish an annual report that it also contains statistical data, description and status of various
cases of corruption that they are handled, including the cases of corruption that involving the Head of
Regions. However, given the fact that KPK is a new institution that just established in December 2003,
the cases handled by them are cases that started from 2004 while the big bang decentralization in
Indonesia has been conducted since January 2001. Therefore, the cases presented here cannot describe
the progress of cases from before 2001 and in the period 2001-2003. From the various cases, then will
be selected 4 cases to be further described. The selection of cases is based on the availability of
information as well as the different types of case.
By referring to the KPK annual reports during 2004-2010, we could obtained information on various
corruption cases that handled by the KPK, as can be seen in table 1. Based on data in table 1, it can be
seen that from 245 corruption cases handled by the KPK since 2004 to 2010, about 30 cases (12.24%)
are the cases that involving the Head of Regions, of which 8 cases involving the Governor and remain 22
cases involving the Regent/Mayor. Where are averaged, each year there are at least 4 cases of
corruption that involving the Head of Regions. This condition is of course very disturbing for us. It is by
remembering that the cases are only the cases that handled by the KPK. There are still some other cases
of corruption by the Head of Regions that handled by the Attorney General Office that its number is
likely far more than the cases that handled by the KPK. This is related to the size of the KPK compared to
the organization of the Attorney General Office. These conditions also troubling because it is also related
to the important role and large function of a Head of Region in the era of regional autonomy. The
involvement of so many Head of Regions in various corruption cases could indicate that they are still
some problematic in the implementation of decentralization in Indonesia. The practice of
decentralization in Indonesia has not been able to support the implementation of good governance. The
successful implementation of decentralization in support of good governance would be marked by small
number of corruption cases that plagued the regional governments, especially that done and involving a
Head of Region. The large number of corruption cases that involving Head of Region have indicated the
persistence of problems that must be corrected in the implementation of decentralization in Indonesia.
As closing remarks, it can be concluded that the implementation of decentralization in Indonesia in
practice has led to many cases of corruption by head of regions. This occurs as a result of the weakness
or absence of legal framework; mechanisms of accountability and transparency in regional government,
role and participation of the community; and monitoring and evaluation system by the central
government. Mechanisms of accountability and transparency as well as the role and participation of the
community are an issue that is relatively less attention so far from government.
In order to reduce the occurrence of corruption committed by head of regions, various improvement
and reinforcement of the weaknesses had to be done. Strengthening mechanisms of accountability,
transparency and public participation should be the main agenda that must be done by governments
and other stakeholders. In addition, improvements to the legal framework and system of monitoring
and evaluation by the central government to regional governments should still be done.
References
Azfar, Omar, Satu Kahkonen, Anthony Lanyi, Patrick Meagher and Diana Rutherford. (1999).
“Decentralization, Governance and Public Services The Impact of Intitutional Arrangements: A
Review of the Literature”. IRIS Center, University of Maryland, pp. 1-35
Bjedov, Tjasa, Thierry Madies and Simon Schnyder. (2010). “Corruption and Decentralization: What
Economists Have to Say about It”, Urban Public Economics Review, No. 3, pp. 12-33
Callahan, Kathe. (2007). Elements of Effective Governance: Measurement, Accountability and
Participation, Florida: CRC Taylor & Francis Group
Kauzya, John-Mary. (2005). “Decentralization: Prospects for Peace, democracy and Development”,
DPADM Discussion paper, DPADM, DESA, UN, pp. 1-18
Johnson, Craig. (2001). “Local Democracy, Democratic Decentralisation and Rural Development:
Theories, Challenges and Options for Policy”, Development Policy Review, Volume 19, No. 4, pp.
521-532
Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (KPK/Corruption Eradication Commission). (2011). “Kajian Kebijakan
Pengelolaan Belanja Bantuan Sosial di Pemerintahan Daerah”, Bahan Paparan, Jakarta, 5 April
2011 (Study on Management Policy of Social Assistance Expenditures by Regional Government,
Material Exposure that presented on April, 5, 2011)
______________. (2010). Laporan tahunan/Annual Report 2010, Jakarta: KPK
______________. (2009). Laporan tahunan/Annual Report 2009, Jakarta: KPK
______________. (2008). Laporan tahunan/Annual Report 2008, Jakarta: KPK
______________. (2007). Laporan tahunan/Annual Report 2007, Jakarta: KPK
______________. (2006). Laporan tahunan/Annual Report 2006, Jakarta: KPK
______________. (2005). Laporan tahunan/Annual Report 2005, Jakarta: KPK
______________. (2004). Laporan tahunan/Annual Report 2004, Jakarta: KPK
Mahkamah Agung (Supreme Court). (2007). Putusan/Verdict No. 380 K/Pid.Sus/2007
Manor, James. (1999). “The Political Economy of Democratic Decentralization, Washington DC: World
Bank
Monte, Alfredo Del and Erasmo Papagni. (2007). “The determinants of corruption in Italy: Regional panel
data analysis”, European Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 23, Issue. 2, pp 379-396
Nas, Tevfik F, Albert C Price, and Charles T Weber. (1986). “A Policy-Oriented Theory of Corruption”, The
American Political Science Review, Vol 80, No. 1, pp. 107-119
Prasojo, Eko. (2011). “Republik Tersandera Korupsi”, Kompas, 24 Januari 2011 (Republic that hostage by
corruption, opinion in Kompas newspaper)
______________. (2009). Reformasi Kedua: Melanjutkan Estafet Reformasi, Jakarta: Penerbit Salemba
Humanika (Second Reform: Continuing the Reform Relay)
______________. (2008). “Mainstreaming Decentralized Governance in Indonesia”, Program
Documents, unpublished
Prasojo, Eko, et al. (2010). “Dampak Desentralisasi terhadap Pemanfaatan Sumber Daya Alam dan
Kerusakan Lingkungan”, Laporan Penelitian, Depok: Universitas Indonesia (Impact of
Decentralization on the Utilization of Natural Resources and Environmental Degradation, research
report)
Rondinelli, Dennis A, John R Nellis dan G Shabbir Cheema. (1983). Decentralization in Developing
Countries: A Review of Recent Experience, Washington DC: World Bank
Shah, Anwar. (Editor). (2007). Performance Accountability and Combating Corruption, Washington DC:
The World Bank
______________. (1998). “Balance, Accountability, and Responsiveness: Lessons about
Decentralization”, Policy Research Working Paper, No. 2021, World Bank, pp. 1-41
Tanzi, Vito. (1998). “Corruption around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cures”, IMF Staff
Papers, Vol. 45, No. 4, pp. 559-594
World Bank. (2005) East Asia Decentralize: Making Local Government Work. Washington DC: The World
Bank
World Bank Institute (WBI). (2001). Improving Governance and Controlling Corruption: Towards a
participatory and action-oriented approach grounded on empirical rigor, Washington DC: World
Bank
Kompas, 6 April 2001, “Penggunaan dana bantuan sosial yang bersumber dari APBD atau APBN rawan di
korupsi” (the use of social assistance funds sourced from local or national budgets is corruption
prone)
Kompas, 26 Maret 2011, “Kasus Korupsi Kehutanan: Bupati Siak Arwin AS ditahan KPK” (Corruption case
in forestry: Regent of Siak Arwin AS detained by KPK)
Kompas, 18 Januari 2001, “17 Gubernur berstatus tersangka” (17 Governor got suspect status)
Koran Tempo, 6 April 2011, “KPK: Dana Sosial Rawan di korupsi” (KPK: Social Funds is Corruption Prone)
Media Indonesia, 9 Maret 2011, “Kepala Daerah Banyak Korupsi Pengadaan” (Head of regions much
corrupt on procurement)
Media Indonesia, 25 Februari 2011, “Sejumlah Kepala Daerah Diduga Terkait Korupsi” (a number of head
of regions allegedly related to corruption)
http://www.tempo.co.id/hg/narasi/2004/11/04/nrs,20041104-01,id.html (Desentralisasi Korupsi
Melalui Otonomi Daerah/Decentralization Corruption through Regional Autonomy)
http://acch.kpk.go.id/web/guest/samsuri-aspar
http://acch.kpk.go.id/web/guest/abdillah
http://acch.kpk.go.id/web/guest/jimmy-rimba-rogi
Indonesian Air Force Projects 10 Fighting Squadrons
Indonesian Air Force Projects 10 Fighting Squadrons
28 jun 2011
Indonesian Air Force (TNI AU) will have 10 fighter sguadron by 2025 (photo : Detik)TEMPO Interactive, Jakarta: The Indonesian Air Force is projecting to improve its military force by 2025, but the plan is hampered by budget issues. Although it has tried to improve the budget, the increase has not been significant.
Indonesian Air Force expert staffer Marshall Parulian Simamora, said the target was to have 10 fighting squadrons, 7 carrier squadrons, 1 VIP/VVIP squadron, 3 strategic spy squadrons, 6 helicopter squadrons, 4 training squadrons, 1 tanker squadron, and 1 PTTA/UAV squadron and military equipment by 2025.
In 2011, the Indonesian Armed Forces was given a Rp44 billion budget, while the Air Force was given Rp7.4 trillion, Rp4.2 trillion of which was used to improve existing military equipment.
Which such budget, the military hopes the national industry can maximize the development of the military and defense equipment industry. Indonesian Air Force chief of staff Marshall Imam Sufaat said a strong local defense industry could reduce dependency on foreign aid.
Imam said the local industry he referred to was not only the plane, rocket, satellite and air balloon manufacturing industry, but also the aviation system industry or airplane component industry. Besides the industry sector, air defense must also be supported by the aviation service, such as air transportation, telecommunication services, flight safety, and maintenance.
PT Dirgantara Indonesia’s Aerostructure director Andi Alisjahbana, said the need for fighting and defense equipment did not always rely on foreign producers. Maintenance and repairs are needed to generate the component industry.
Dirgantara has developed a specific aircraft for the past two years. This year, PT Dirgantara plans to send four aircrafts to South Korea. The four aircrafts, valued at US$100 million, were ordered by the Korean Coast Guard.
In case Pi Day wasn't enough, it's now 'Tau Day' on the Internet
On the Internet, anything can be the basis for a holiday -- even a number.
You may recall that the day honoring the number Pi -- which is March 14 (3/14 ... get it?) -- has become a worldwide phenomenon. Pi Day now features pie-eating contests, digit recitations and educational games.And now, just when you thought the math holiday season was over, it's time for Tau Day!
There's a movement afoot online to celebrate tau, approximately 6.28, instead of the familiar constant pi, which is about 3.14.
Pi -- just think back to grade school -- is the ratio of circumference to diameter of a circle. Tau, on the other hand, is circumference divided by radius.
Chew on that for a minute.
This idea of using a single symbol for 2 times pi is now at least 10 years old, having cropped up in a 2001 essay by Bob Palais called "Pi is wrong!"
But it exploded on the Internet last Tau Day -- June 28 (6/28) -- when Michael Hartl launched the Tau Manifesto, a lengthy treatise about why pi is confusing and should be replaced with tau.
Why tau?
Among Hartl's reasons for using tau:
-- Tau is the ratio of circumference to radius of a circle, and circles are more naturally defined by their radius than diameter.
-- Radians, a unit to measure angles of a circle, are confusing to new learners because of all the factors of 2. There are 2pi radians in a full circle, and pi radians in half a circle. With tau, things become simpler: the full circle is tau radians, and the half-turn is ½ tau radians.
"There definitely are some people who have trouble with the notation," says Hartl, a physicist and entrepreneur. "I would eventually like to see that the mathematical powers that be acknowledge the problem."
And what do the powers that be say? There is a sense that 2 times pi -- or what Hartl calls "tau" -- is important, but it's still a multiple of pi, which is a fundamental constant of mathematics, Ivars Peterson, director of publications and communications at the Mathematical Association of America, told me in March.
Tau Day is "creative," but tau itself is just one particular repackaging of pi. "It will work for some things and not other things," he said.
But Hartl is still trying. In honor of Tau Day, Hartl is giving a talk at California Institute of Technology based on his Tau Manifesto, which he assures us is more entertaining than a normal lecture. And afterward will be a reception with pies -- "twice as many as you might expect," of course.
Hartl isn't alone in his interest in tau. He gets e-mails all the time from tau enthusiasts.
"One commenter said, 'If we don't fix this, everyone at the Galactic Congress is going to laugh at us,'" Hartl said.
The math music saga continues
Michael John Blake, who made a big splash among nerds for his pi song in March, has taken some of the first digits of tau and put them to music. (Check it out on YouTube). Tau, like pi, has infinitely many digits arranged in an apparently random order, so it's impossible to use them all.
Blake learned about tau when I interviewed him for Pi Day this year. He'd never heard of it before, and had no idea how it would sound, but he took the challenge.
"The tau melody is a bit more melancholy, and the timing gives it that waltzy feel which I love," he says.
But Blake isn't the only one with an interest in turning math into music. His pi song was taken off YouTube because of alleged copyright infringement.
Lars Erickson, a musician in Omaha, Nebraska, is suing Blake in Nebraska District Court. Erickson also used the digits of pi (as well as the constant e) as the basis for the melody of his Pi Symphony, which was performed by the Omaha Symphony Orchestra Chamber group and by Ruse Philharmonic of Bulgaria last year.
Erickson alleges that Blake's pi song "sounded substantially similar," and therefore infringes the copyrighted melody that Erickson registered in 1992.
"Pi is a math constant. Nobody can copyright pi. The melody made from pi is a melody, and all melodies exist in pi somewhere," Erickson told me Monday. "I only copyrighted the melody of pi to protect my work, just like anybody would copyright their work."
Blake counters that a melody translated from a number cannot be copyrighted.
As for tau, Erickson says he doesn't care for its melody. But Blake has plenty of fans of his tau interpretation on YouTube. And one woman in Australia contacted Hartl and Blake for permission to play it for her Tau Day party.
Hartl hasn't created any rituals for this holiday -- he just wants people to know about it. "Eating twice as much pie probably good enough for now," he said.
If you want to memorize the digits of tau, here's the first 100,000 to get started.
And if you're really ambitious, you can post a video of yourself learning all these numbers -- on the Internet, of course.
Companies Are Erecting In-House Social Networks
What would Facebook look like without photos of drunken nights out and tales of misbehaving cats? It might look a lot like the internal social network at the offices of Nikon Instruments.
The tone is decidedly businesslike, as employees exchange messages about customer orders, new products and closing deals. And the general rule is that “if you don’t want your company president to see it, don’t post it,” said John G. Bivona, a customer relations manager at Nikon Instruments, which makes microscopes.
As social networks increasingly dominate communications in private lives, businesses of all sizes — from tiny start-ups to midsize companies like Nikon to behemoths like Dell — are adopting them for the workplace. Although it is difficult to quantify how many companies use internal social networks, a number of corporate software companies have sensed the opportunity and offer various systems, some free to existing customers, others that charge a fee per user.
It’s one more instance of how consumer technology trends, like the use of tablet computers, are crossing into office life. Because of Facebook, most people are already comfortable with the idea of “following” their colleagues. But in the business world, the connections are between colleagues, not personal friends or family, and the communications are meant to be about work matters — like team projects, production flaws and other routine business issues.
At Nikon, for example, which employs 500 people in offices throughout the United States, Canada and Brazil, a code of conduct for using the service leaves little room for the idle chit-chat that is pervasive on Facebook.
Still, it can be tricky to transport the mores and practices of social networking into the office.
For instance, some workers prefer to be “lurkers” who read posts rather than write them. Others are just not interested. At Symantec, the computer security company, a few employees initially disliked the idea of an internal social network, but nevertheless used it to air their complaints.
Another issue is how to protect corporate secrets. The systems are generally set up so that companies can determine who sees particular files and who belongs to specific groups on the network. Yet problems still arise over where the data is ultimately stored. Some social network providers use their own servers. But that may conflict with the rules of some potential clients that prohibit storing company information outside their firewall, said Susan Landry, an analyst with Gartner.
Companies that provide social networks respond to the concerns by emphasizing their rigorous security. Still, some offer networks that allow customers to keep their data on their own servers.
And employees may post private information more widely than they should.
“It’s sometimes a disaster,” Ms. Landry said. “It sometimes gets shut down by security or compliance.”
At the same time, even though companies make clear in etiquette guides how to use the networks, missteps occur. For example, at Symantec, a worker posted his cat’s photo in his profile instead of his own. A well-meaning worker at Nikon alerted everyone to apple pie in the kitchen; never mind that colleagues in other offices were not interested.
One of the biggest providers of corporate social networks is Salesforce.com, the online business software company based in San Francisco. It said 80,000 companies use its corporate social network, Chatter, up from around 10,000 when it was introduced a year ago. Yammer, a start-up and also based in San Francisco, said its service is used by more than 100,000 companies, up from around 80,000 a year ago.
SAP, Cisco Systems, Socialtext, Jive Software and SuccessFactors are also pushing their products. Last month, VMware joined the list when it acquired Socialcast, one of the earlier networking services.
The tone is decidedly businesslike, as employees exchange messages about customer orders, new products and closing deals. And the general rule is that “if you don’t want your company president to see it, don’t post it,” said John G. Bivona, a customer relations manager at Nikon Instruments, which makes microscopes.
As social networks increasingly dominate communications in private lives, businesses of all sizes — from tiny start-ups to midsize companies like Nikon to behemoths like Dell — are adopting them for the workplace. Although it is difficult to quantify how many companies use internal social networks, a number of corporate software companies have sensed the opportunity and offer various systems, some free to existing customers, others that charge a fee per user.
It’s one more instance of how consumer technology trends, like the use of tablet computers, are crossing into office life. Because of Facebook, most people are already comfortable with the idea of “following” their colleagues. But in the business world, the connections are between colleagues, not personal friends or family, and the communications are meant to be about work matters — like team projects, production flaws and other routine business issues.
At Nikon, for example, which employs 500 people in offices throughout the United States, Canada and Brazil, a code of conduct for using the service leaves little room for the idle chit-chat that is pervasive on Facebook.
Still, it can be tricky to transport the mores and practices of social networking into the office.
For instance, some workers prefer to be “lurkers” who read posts rather than write them. Others are just not interested. At Symantec, the computer security company, a few employees initially disliked the idea of an internal social network, but nevertheless used it to air their complaints.
Another issue is how to protect corporate secrets. The systems are generally set up so that companies can determine who sees particular files and who belongs to specific groups on the network. Yet problems still arise over where the data is ultimately stored. Some social network providers use their own servers. But that may conflict with the rules of some potential clients that prohibit storing company information outside their firewall, said Susan Landry, an analyst with Gartner.
Companies that provide social networks respond to the concerns by emphasizing their rigorous security. Still, some offer networks that allow customers to keep their data on their own servers.
And employees may post private information more widely than they should.
“It’s sometimes a disaster,” Ms. Landry said. “It sometimes gets shut down by security or compliance.”
At the same time, even though companies make clear in etiquette guides how to use the networks, missteps occur. For example, at Symantec, a worker posted his cat’s photo in his profile instead of his own. A well-meaning worker at Nikon alerted everyone to apple pie in the kitchen; never mind that colleagues in other offices were not interested.
One of the biggest providers of corporate social networks is Salesforce.com, the online business software company based in San Francisco. It said 80,000 companies use its corporate social network, Chatter, up from around 10,000 when it was introduced a year ago. Yammer, a start-up and also based in San Francisco, said its service is used by more than 100,000 companies, up from around 80,000 a year ago.
SAP, Cisco Systems, Socialtext, Jive Software and SuccessFactors are also pushing their products. Last month, VMware joined the list when it acquired Socialcast, one of the earlier networking services.
Indonesia finds new gas, oil, and coal reserves in Sumatra
Jul 28, 2011
Indonesia finds new gas, oil, and coal reserves in Sumatra
New gas, oil, and coal reserves were discovered in Indonesia's island of Sumatra, which could have significantimpact in the region's development, officials said Monday.
The reserves were found in the the village of Muaro Sekalo in the district of Tebo, which is located in Sumatra's Jambi Province, district chief Majdi Muaz told Antara news agency, noting that the small village is lying on large quantities of these reserves.
Majdi said expert teams were to begin investigations in order to determine the exact amount of gas, oil, and coal reserves found in the area. However, the district chief underlined the importance for officials to find credible and trusted investors and development teams to tap the natural resources.
The Mauro Sekalo village has an economy primarily based on agriculture, but the discovery of these reserves could heavily impact the region's economic growth and social development in the upcoming future.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)